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A PROPOSAL FOR COMPENSATING LANDOWNERS FOR THE
EFFECTS OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
With the growth of urban areas in America has come a corresponding
growth in urban decay. To revitalize and redevelop urban centers, gov-
ernment often relies on its power of eminent domain to appropriate
land that is necessary to accommodate renewal plans. But the use of
eminent domain power and the resulting condemnation proceedings
affect the value of property owned not only by persons within but also
those adjacent to areas being condemned. When property suffers a loss
in value as a result of condemnation activities, the manner in which a
court resolves the compensation question may have a significant im-
pact on whether a landowner receives adequate compensation or, for
that matter, any compensation at all. This Note reviews the past and
present law in the area of compensating landowners for losses suffered
as a result of governmental action and, finding the present Minnesota
law to be inadequate, suggests a standard by which a more equitable
resolution of the compensation question can be made.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to reverse the process of urban decay, government increas-
ingly has exercised its power of eminent domain.' But redevelopment
projects are highly complicated and time-consuming endeavors., Be-
tween bureaucratic processing and unavoidable delay, substantial peri-
ods of time may elapse before the project results in land acquisitions.-
Often during that time knowledge of the imminence of the taking is
widespread.' The results of such knowledge typically include the mass
exodus of tenants, reluctance of the owners of the buildings involved to
make improvements or perform maintenance, and a decrease in police
protection with a corresponding increase in crime. Additionally, prop-
erty values may be reduced in both the area to be condemned and
abutting areas.'
1. See 72 COLUM. L. REv. 772, 773-74 (1972). As modern society became more industrial-
ized, cities developed as the focal points of production and trade. Large populations
shifted from a rural to an urban setting. These masses of people required an accelerated
expansion of housing and similar municipal services, which could not be met by many
city governments nor by private enterprise. As a result, many of these inhabitants were
forced to live in substandard, unsanitary conditions, from which developed the slums that
exist today. Urban renewal programs constitute one response by the government aimed
at remedying this deterioration. Adams, Eminent Domain, Police Power and Urban Re-
newal: Compensation for Interim Depreciation in Land Values, 7 GA. L. R~v. 226, 226
(1973).
2. See 4 J. SACKMAN, NICHoLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3151 (rev. 3d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as 4 NicHoLs] ("It rarely happens that proceedings for the condemna-
tion of [landi for public use are instituted without months, years, and in some instances,
decades of time spent in preliminary discussion and in the making of tentative plans.");
72 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 1, at 774.
3. See 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2; Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just
Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765, 767 (1973).
Varying lengths of time may elapse between the initial proposals and planning for land
acquisition and the actuM taking and appropriation. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit,
254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) (14 years); City of
Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965) (12 years between initial an-
nouncement and initiation of condemnation proceeding); City of Cleveland v. Hurwitz,
19 Ohio Misc. 184, 249 N.E.2d 562 (1969) (eight years before final approval of plan to
acquire); A. Gettelman Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 245 Wis. 9, 13 N.W.2d 541
(1944) (31 years; proposals for street widening commenced in 1909 but property not ac-
quired until 1940).
4. Kanner, supra note 3, at 767. Frequently, before such projects are commenced they
are communicated to the public through official or unofficial announcements, including
newspaper accounts, and by the spread of rumors. Note, The Condemnor's Liability for
Damages Arising Through Instituting, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Domain
Proceedings, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 548, 549. In addition, the commencement of the condem-
nation procedure constitutes, by itself, an announcement of a proposed project. 8 P. ROHAN
& M. RESKIN, NICHOLS' THe LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.021l[a] (rev. 3d ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as 8 NICHOLS].
5. See, e.g., 8 NICHOLS, supra note 4; Note, supra note 4, at 549. For example, in the
case of In re City of New York 572 Warren St., 58 Misc. 2d 1073, 298 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup.
Ct. 1968), the condemning authority sent a booklet to each of the tenants in an area
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COMPENSATION FOR LANDOWNERS
This Note first reviews the theories that courts have used to determine
whether government must pay compensation for loss in property value
when that loss is caused by governmental action.' Second, an overview
of basic principles used to determine whether condemnation activity
causes a compensable injury is presented,' followed by a discussion of
the present Minnesota law in this area.' A standard by which losses
caused by condemnation activities can be compensated then is pro-
posed.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF EMINENT DOMAIN PRINCIPLES
Eminent domain refers to the state's power to appropriate private
property for a public use."0 This power exists independently of a state's
constitution" as an inherent attribute of sovereignty. 2 The eminent
advising them that the subject property would be appropriated for a housing project and
that they would be assisted in moving but that they did not have to move immediately.
The result was described as follows:
[ilmmediately after these letters and pamphlets were distributed throughout
the house, tenants began to move out and the vacated apartments were
promptly vandalized, with thefts of refrigerators, stoves, kitchen tubs, etc.
[Two months later] . . . half of the tenants had moved and most of the others
had refused to pay any rent....
[When] cooler weather came in, the landlord was getting practically no
income whatsoever. None of the vacated apartments could be rerented because
of the vandalism and also because the impending condemnation had been
noised throughout the area by the [condemning authority] employees. As a
result, the landlord could not raise the necessary funds for repairs or fuel, and
by November, about 75% of the tenants had vacated.
Id. at 1075-76, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 431-32.
6. See notes 10-65 infra and accompanying text. Although the eminent domain issues
presented in this Note have been examined specifically in the context of urban renewal
projects, the principles should apply to condemnation cases in general.
7. See notes 66-231 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 232-50 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 260-83 infra and accompanying text.
10. See State v. Bentley, 216 Minn. 146, 153, 12 N.W.2d 347, 352 (1943); cf. Davidson
v. County Comm'rs, 18 Minn. 482 (Gil. 432) (1872) (financial aid to railroads from public
taxes not an exercise of eminent domain).
11. State ex. rel. Mountain Timber Co. v. Superior Courti 77 Wash. 585, 587, 137 P.
994, 995 (1914); see State v. Flach, 213 Minn. 353, 356, 6 N.W.2d 805, 807 (1942); State
v. Severson, 194 Minn. 644, 646, 261 N.W. 469, 470 (1935).
12. United States v. Federal Land Bank, 127 F.2d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 1942); County of
Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 225, 210 N.W.2d 290, 295 (1973); In re Burnquist, 220
Minn. 129, 132, 19 N.W.2d 77, 79 (1945); see Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d
603, 605 (Minn. 1978). The sovereign may exercise its power of eminent domain for autho-
rized purposes, and when it does so, the landowner must submit. In re Burnquist, 220
Minn. at 132, 19 N.W.2d at 79. In this respect, the ownership of all land may be considered
to be retained by the sovereign and possession can be resumed when a public need for that
land arises, subject to constitutional limitiations on the power. See, e.g., Daniels v. State
Road Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 848 (Fla. 1964); In re Burnquist, 220 Minn. at 132, 19 N.W.2d
at 79; State v. Flach, 213 Minn. 353, 356, 6 N.W.2d 805, 807 (1942).
19791
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domain power is subject, however, to a constitutional requirement in all
states but one' that a property owner be compensated justly for any
taking." But, while a state's constitution may require compensation for
a taking, the government has a strong interest in exercising its full
potential for the general welfare, unhandicapped by the financial drain
that would result from compensating landowners for all potential ad-
verse effects of public programs and activities. 5 Therefore, a loss that
results from governmental action that is not a taking is not compensa-
ble 6 because "even the most affluent society cannot feasibly assume the
costs of socializing all the private losses that flow from the activities of
organized government."'" Courts usually base their conclusion that com-
pensation need not be paid on the premise that the government merely
has exercised its police power, 8 which is a power inherent in the sover-
eign to regulate private rights for the general welfare without compen-
sating for such regulation."
13. See note 167 infra.
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation"); N.Y. CoNST. art. 1, § 7(a) ("Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation."). In Minnesota, the constitution
places an additional limitation by requiring just compensation for any damage to prop-
erty. See MINN. CONS. art. 1, § 13 ("Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or
damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured."). The
differences in constitutional provisions will be the subject of further discussion in this
Note. See notes 167-98 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8
SANTA CtARA LAw. 1, 26 (1967).
16. See, e.g., Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 305 Minn. 336, 341, 232 N.W.2d 923,
927 (1975) (per curiam) (diminution in value resulting from precondemnation activities
held not to constitute a taking; compensation denied).
Similarly, in states in which the constitutions prohibit uncompensated "damage" to
property, a loss that does not constitute damage is not compensable. See Wolfram v.
State, 246 Minn. 264, 267, 74 N.W.2d 510, 512 (1956) (not every diminution in property
value caused by a public improvement compensable as "damage" to the property).
17. Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 26-27. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), Justice Holmes stated: "Government hardly could go on if, to some extent,
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law." Id. at 413. Such a conclusion assumes either that some losses of values
associated with property ownership inevitably go uncompensated and hence are justifiable
costs of social progress, or that such losses will be offset by the net long-term benefits
accruing to the entire community. Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 27.
18. See Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Minn. 1978) ("Illf a
governmental action has been found not to infringe the right of access, such action has
been deemed a 'reasonable' assertion of the police power and therefore noncompens-
able.").
19. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 441, 127 N.W.2d 165, 170 (1964)
("All courts seem to agree that if the regulation or restriction falls within the state's 'police
power,' no compensable loss has occurred."). Individual rights are subject to the inherent
police power of the sovereign. See Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co. v. City of Minneapolis,
81 Minn. 140, 147, 83 N.W. 527, 530 (1900), aff'd on rehearing, 81 Minn. 150, 86 N.W. 69
(1901). Generally, the police power is restricted to those situations involving public health,
[Vol. 5
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For many years, this analysis appeared straightforward: takings were
compensable and police power regulations were not.0 In 1922, however,
Justice Holmes expanded on the analysis in a short statement that is
now famous for the confused state in which it left this area of the law.
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,"' he stated "that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." The problem with Holmes' statement, how-
ever, is that no precise formula can be utilized to determine when regu-
lation ends and taking begins.u Nevertheless, Pennsylvania Coal repre-
morals, or safety, that is, the general welfare. See, e.g., County of Freeborn v. Claussen,
295 Minn. 96, 101, 203 N.W.2d 323, 327 (1972) (residential zoning advanced public welfare
and was valid exercise of police power); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of
Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 498, 162 N.W.2d 206, 212 (1968) (aesthetic consideration can
be major factor in enacting zoning restriction that is reasonably related to promoting
general welfare); Perron v. Village of New Brighton, 275 Minn. 119, 125, 145 N.W.2d 425,
429 (1966) (zoning boundary prohibiting multiple-family dwellings on one side of street
was reasonable exercise of police power); Fairmont Foods Co. v. City of Duluth, 260 Minn.
323, 325, 328, 110 N.W.2d 155, 157, 159 (1961) (restriction of bacterial count of raw milk
did not protect public health and welfare so as to justify exercise of police power); Gopher
Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn. 514, 517, 75 N.W.2d 780, 783 (1956) (city reasonably
exercised discretion in granting all of a limited number of pinball machine licenses to one
of two applicants; pinball machines may affect public morality, thus coming within pur-
view of police power).
20. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36-37 (1964).
21. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In that case, the plaintiff homeowner sued the defendant coal
company to enjoin the mining of coal beneath the plaintiff's home. The defendant had
previously deeded the property to the plaintiff, expressly reserving the right to remove all
of the coal from beneath the surface. Subsequent to that transfer, the Pennsylvania
Legislature enacted a statute prohibiting the mining of coal beneath anyone's home if the
mining could cause the structure to collapse. The focal issue on appeal was whether the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, that is, whether prohibition of
the defendant's right to remove the coal constituted a taking without just compensation.
The Court concluded that the prohibition against mining constituted an appropriation of
the defendant's property. See id. at 414.
22. Id. at 415.
23. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); State ex rel. Lacht-
man v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 230, 158 N.W. 1017, 1019 (1916) (dividing line between
police power restrictions and compensable takings or damage has not and cannot be
distinctly marked out). The United States Supreme Court has yet to establish a consistent
rationale and "operates somewhat haphazardly, using any or all of the available, often
conflicting theories without developing any clear approach to the constitutional problem."
Sax, supra note 20, at 46; see State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. at 230, 158
N.W. at 1019 ("As different cases arise, the courts determine from the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case whether it falls upon one side or the other of the line
[between police power restrictions and compensable takings or damage]."). The United
States Supreme Court recently reiterated that it has been unable to develop a "set for-
mula" for determining when compensation should be awarded for economic injuries re-
sulting from public activities. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S.
Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978). In Penn Central, the property owner challenged the validity of the
regulation of historic landmarks, alleging the regulating constituted a taking absent com-
pensation to property owners. See id. at 2657. In 1967 after the New York City Landmarks
5
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sents a rejection of previous rationales in which the difference between
a police power regulation and an eminent domain taking was one of
kind, not of degree." Now, after Pennsylvania Coal, the concepts of
regulation and taking converge on a continuum along which police
power at some point ends and eminent domain begins."8
Such a continuum, however, is more useful as a description of the
result of the government's action than as an actual test to be used in
determining whether compensation is required." Therefore, several legal
theories have been developed for determining whether the government's
actions require compensation. The theories most commonly advocated
by authorities in the field of condemnation lawn are physical invasion,"
noxious use, n diminution in value,31 and balancing of interests.
Preservation Commission had designated the well-known Grand Central Station as a
landmark, the owners unsuccessfully sought permission from the commission to construct
an office tower more than 50 stories high above the terminal. See id. at 2655-56 & n.16.
The owner claimed that, because the city had taken the "air rights" above the terminal
and diminished the value of the site, the designation imposed a greater burden on the
owner than on other property owners, thereby warranting compensation. Rejecting this
argument, the Court noted that legislation designed to promote the general welfare may
impose a greater burden on some property owners than on others. See id. at 2664. The
Court held that the landmarks law benefited all New York citizens and buildings by
providing both general economic benefits and an improved quality of life, id. at 2665,
without unreasonably interfering with the owner's beneficial use of the terminal. Id. at
2666.
24. See Mercer, REGULATION (Police Power) V. TAKING (Eminent Domain), 6 N.C.
CENTRAL L.J. 177, 182 (1975). An example of the previous rationale can be found in Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1877). In that case Justice Harlan stated that the police power
regulation of a public nuisance to protect public health differs from the taking of unoffend-
ing property. Thus, the Court held that the prohibition against the manufacture of liquor
did not constitute a taking of plaintiff's brewery. For a general discussion of the distinction
between the approaches taken by Justices Harlan and Holmes, see Sax, supra note 20, at
38-46.
25. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 27-28.
26. See Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Minn. 1978); Hendrickson
v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 441-42, 127 N.W.2d 165, 170 (1964); Van Alstyne, supra note 15,
at 28.
27. See generally Haigler, Mclnerny & Rhodes, The Legislature's Role in the Taking
Issue, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 14-22 (1976); Mercer, supra note 24, at 185-90; Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1183-1201 (1967); Olson, The Role of "Fairness" in
Establishing a Constitutional Theory of Taking, 3 URB. LAW. 440, 442-49 (1971); Sax,
supra note 20, at 46-60; Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 13-25; Comment, "Takings" Under
the Police Power-The Development of Inverse Condemnation as a Method of Challenging
Zoning Ordinances, 30 Sw. L.J. 723, 726-28 (1976); Comment, De Facto Taking and
Municipal Clearance Projects: City Plan or City Scheme?, 9 URB. L. ANN. 317, 318-19
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, De Facto Takingi.
28. See notes 32-38 infra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 39-47 infra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 48-56 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 57-65 infra and accompanying text.
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A. Physical Invasion Theory
Older cases restricted compensable takings to governmental action in
which the claimant's land was physically used or occupied. 32 According
to the physical invasion theory, property loss was compensable only if
the state physically encroached on or physically interfered with the
private property.Y This theory was particularly adaptable to a simple
society in which regulation of private property interests and economic
activity was not extensive.3 ' As society became more complex, however,
the accompanying social problems increased. As a consequence of gov-
ernments' attempts to alleviate these social problems, the regulation of
private property rights became more complex = and modem regulations
caused an impact on private property interests similar to that caused
by physical intrusions. 3 Hence, the validity of the physical invasion
theory is questionable37 and, in American jurisprudence, generally is
considered obsolete.u
32. See Michelman, supra note 27, at 1184. Compare Hyde v. Minnesota, D. & P. Ry.,
29 S.D. 220, 238-39, 136 N.W. 92, 99 (1912) (closing of streets near but not adjacent to
plaintiff's property from operation of railroad did not damage property uniquely) with
Searle v. City of Lead, 10 S.D. 312, 73 N.W. 101 (1897) (city's raising of street in front of
plaintiff's property held to damage plaintiff's property).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 165-66 (1958)
(federal government closed gold mines to induce experienced miners to engage in war-
related work; because the government "did not occupy, use or in any manner take physical
possession of the gold mines," no taking occurred); Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S.
217, 225 (1904) (no taking occurred where construction of retaining wall by federal govern-
ment may have contributed to flooding and erosion of claimant's land resulting primarily
from natural causes; case distinguished from those cases in which actual invasion rather
than consequential invasion occurs); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 643
(1878) (when construction of tunnel did not result in physical invasion of claimant's
property, compensation inappropriate); Michelman, supra note 27, at 1184; Van Alstyne,
supra note 15, at 13-14.
34. See Mercer, supra note 24, at 185. Land often was undeveloped by owners when the
government first used its powers of eminent domain. Consequently, the occurrence of
incidental losses resulting from condemnation was rare. Little hardship was suffered by
landowners because of the requirement that a physical invasion occur before awarding
compensation. See Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 280, 177 N.W.2d 380, 384-
85 (1970).
35. See State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 150, 204 N.W. 569, 570 (1925),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Beery v. Houghton, 273 U.S. 671 (1927); cf. Luber v. Milwaukee
County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 280, 177 N.W.2d 380, 384-85 (1970) (with urbanization, govern-
ment now redevelops properties, increasing likelihood of harmful incidental damages that
can exceed fair market value of physical property taken).
36. Cf. Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 281, 177 N.W.2d 380, 385-86 (1970)
(dictum) (modern law recognizes that some interests other than land itself cannot be
taken without just compensation).
37. See Mercer, supra note 24, at 185; Sax, supra note 20, at 48; Van Alstyne, supra
note 15, at 14-16.
38. See Sax, supra note 20, at 48; Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 16. Although the
physical invasion theory is outdated as a theory for determining when a taking occurs,
19791
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B. Noxious Use Theory
The noxious use theory has been referred to as the "private fault and
public benefit" theory,"' the "harm prevention and benefit extraction"
theory," and the "nuisance abatement" theory." Having its roots in
nuisance law,'2 the noxious use theory focuses on the purpose of the
governmental action." If the limitation on land use is designed to pre-
vent a nuisance-like activity detrimental to the community's welfare,
the government action is noncompensable; if the limitation forces a
landowner, whose property use is nondetrimental, to confer a public
benefit on the community, compensation is compelled to allocate equi-
tably the costs of the improvement among those who benefit.'
courts never deny compensation when a physical invasion does occur. See Michelman,
supra note 27, at 1184. Recently, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the
relevance of the existence of a physical invasion to the determination as to whether or not
a taking has occurred. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646,
2659 (1978). However, the Court expressly stated that it would not accept the proposition
that a taking could not occur without a physical invasion. See id. at 2659 n.25. Therefore,
although the existence of a physical invasion will mandate compensation, an absence of
a physical invasion no longer conclusively precludes compensation.
39. See Olson, supra note 27, at 448.
40. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 19-20.
41. See Comment, De Facto Taking, supra note 27, at 319.
42. See Mercer, supra note 24, at 185-86. The basic premise behind nuisance law is that
one individual's land use should not be allowed to interfere unreasonably with the use and
enjoyment of another individual's property rights. See 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 480, 481
(1978).
43. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 19-20.
44. Id. For example, municipalities commonly control nuisance-like activity by means
of zoning ordinances. The source of the noxious use is eliminated or relocated by planned
zoning as a valid exercise of the police power. See State ex rel. Howard v. Village of
Roseville, 244 Minn. 343, 347, 70 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1955) (zoning ordinance prohibiting
trailer parks upheld); State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 150-51, 204 N.W.
569, 570 (1925), aff'd mem. sub nor. Beery v. Houghton, 273 U.S. 671 (1927) (zoning
ordinance prohibiting erection of four-family-flat buildings upheld). On the other hand,
when a property owner's reasonable access to a road is substantially impaired for a public
use compensation is mandated. See Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 445-46, 127
N.W.2d 165, 172-73 (1964) (conversion from normal roadway to controlled access highway
with service roads substantially impaired right of reasonably convenient access to high-
way); Bumquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 72, 19 N.W.2d 394, 399 (1945) (highway construc-
tion eliminated easements of access to areas of property suitable for subdivision); Morgan
v. City of Albert Lea, 129 Minn. 59, 65, 151 N.W. 532, 534 (1915) (property owner entitled
to compensation for all substantial injuries to property from public street improvement).
Thus, the noxious use theory imposes a fault/no-fault analysis. The term "fault" indi-
cates that the landowner's conduct is harmful to the general welfare. If the landowner is
at "fault" in this sense, the restriction or destruction of the use does not warrant compen-
sation because the prevention of the harm constitutes a benefit to the general public
welfare. On the other hand, if no "fault" exists on the landowner's part, any benefit
conferred on the public at the landowner's expense would be unjustified, and therefore
the landowner should be compensated. See Olson, supra note 27, at 448.
The contemporary version of this theory analyzes the taking issue by means of a
[Vol. 5
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The problem with the noxious use theory is that some benefit can be
associated with all types of regulation. 5 As a result, the concepts of
"benefits derived" and "nuisance avoided" are viewed more properly
not as descriptions of two distinct regulations but as indicators of
whether the primary intent of a law is to restrict harmful activity or
confer a public benefit.'" The noxious use theory, therefore, often fails
to provide a workable, consistent test.'7
C. Diminution in Value Theory
The diminution in value theory was first enunciated in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon. 1 In announcing the Court's decision, Justice
Holmes stated: "One fact for consideration in determining [the limits
of police power] is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."' 9 This analysis
evidenced the erosion of the physical invasion theory,-" under which the
extent of pecuniary loss is irrelevant."
"creation of the harm" test: if a landowner's use of his property creates harmful results,
he cannot later complain when that use is regulated. See Mercer, supra note 24, at 186.
Generally, regulations designed to prevent nuisance-like activity are of a specific na-
ture: a particular detrimental activity is controlled, leaving the landowner with a variety
of profitable and nonharmful alternatives for which he can use his property. On the other
hand, a regulation designed to confer a benefit on the general public tends to be more
comprehensive, leaving the landowner only with the alternative of engaging in the activity
conferring the benefit. Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 20. Compare Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ban on brick manufacture in residential area held reasonable
exercise of police power) with Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y.
493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) (zoning regulation easing traffic congestion by prohibiting any
use of vacant lot other than for parking amounted to unconstitutional taking without just
compensation).
The "noxious use" approach was recently acknowledged by the United States Supreme
Court in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). In Penn
Central, the Court examined various zoning cases that had precluded compensation de-
spite the devastating economic injuries sustained by the landowners. See id. at 2660-61.
The Court concluded that when such regulations are reasonably related to the promotion
of the general welfare even severe diminutions in property values may be tolerated. See
id. at 2663. The Court held that the designation of the plaintiff's property as a landmark,
which prevented plaintiff from building an office building on top of the property, was
substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and did not constitute a
taking. See id. at 2666.
45. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 20.
46. See id.
47. See id. Nevertheless, the harm-benefit distinction is useful for defining certain
noncompensable losses imposed by regulatory measures. See id. at 21.
48. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
49. 260 U.S. at 413. But see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct.
2646, 2663 (1978) (diminution in property cannot, by itself, constitute a taking within the
meaning of the United States Constitution).
50. See Olson, supra note 27, at 445.
51. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text. Application of the physical invasion
19791
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Given the fact that property, by its nature, usually can be assigned a
monetary value, a theory emphasizing the economic loss suffered by the
landowner as the criteria for compensation seems fair and appealing.
The utility of the theory, however, is impeded by the difficulty the
courts have in defining a dividing line between compensable and non-
compensable losses: by how much must a property's value decrease
before a taking has occurred?52 Generally, the diminution in value
theory requires a significant deprivation as a condition to compensa-
tion.513 Although "significant" is a vague term, it lends some assistance
when determining whether compensation is required. Requiring a signif-
icant diminution is reasonable because governmental programs cannot
be expected to absorb all losses in land values; claims for some losses
must be dismissed as de minimis, too speculative, or unprovable."
Still, many ambiguous situations will exist in which the issue of
whether the diminution is significant remains unclear. While loss
usually can be ascertained with some certainty, the amount of loss not
offset by a public benefit is more difficult to ascertain.15 Thus, the dimi-
nution in value theory seems most useful when the impact of the govern-
mental activity is extremely large or extremely small."
D. Balancing of Interests Theory
According to the balancing theory, the judicial task required is one of
identifying and comparing all competing interests involved in the gov-
ernmental action. Theoretically, when the loss is greater than the bene-
fit, a taking occurs. On the other hand, a claimant is not entitled to
compensation for an injury to his property if the loss to the property is
outweighed by the benefits accruing to society as a result of the govern-
mental action.57 The factors relevant to this determination include: the
theory focuses only on whether a physical invasion has occurred. See Olson, supra note
27, at 445.
52. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 16-17.
53. See Comment, De Facto Taking, supra note 27, at 320; notes 212-18 infra and
accompanying text.
54. Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 17; see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 413 (1922); note 17 supra.
55. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 17.
56. When the diminution in value is extensive, an award of compensation would usually
be justified. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 16. Similarly, when the diminution is
minimal, a denial of compensation would be appropriate. See id. A loss that falls between
these two extremes, however, presents difficulties because the diminution in value theory
provides no line of demarcation to indicate the extent of diminution that triggers a re-
quirement of compensation. In this intermediate situation, the diminution in value would
better be considered as a factor in the court's determination rather than the test to be
applied. See Haigler, McInerny & Rhodes, supra note 27, at 15-16.
57. See Michelman, supra note 27, at 1193. According to Professor Van Alstyne, this
theory is a "manifestation of the tendency of modem jurisprudence to regard litigation as
primarily a process for resolution of conflicts between competing social and economic
[Vol. 5
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extent of the restriction, the nature of the state's interest, the economic
impact on the general community, and the status of the party respons-
ible for creating a problem that necessitates governmental action."
The balancing theory can work a severe injustice, however, if the
application of the theory requires some members of society to sacrifice
valuable property interests for the public welfare5 while other persons
gratuitously receive a special benefit."0 In light of the fact that special
benefits generally will be redistributed throughout society by devices
such as increased taxes, however, the latter consequence is more toler-
able."
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of this theory is the difficulty courts
experience in delineating the precise societal and private interests in-
volved and then striking some meaningful balance between such dissim-
ilar interests.2 This process of ad hoc balancing lacks an objective rule
by which a court's determination can be predicted." In spite of this
shortcoming, the theory is particularly appealing for its reasonable, flex-
ible, and not unfair approach to the problem." The balancing theory,
interests represented by the contending parties." Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 18. For
example, in East Rutherford Indus. Park, Inc. v. State, 119 N.J. Super. 352, 291 A.2d
588 (Law Div. 1972), the court determined that the public interest in being informed about
redevelopment projects "must take precedence" over the injury suffered by landowners
from diminution in property values possibly resulting from publicity of a proposed project.
See id. at 361, 291 A.2d at 593.
58. See Mercer, supra note 24, at 190.
59. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 18. This theory circumvents the taking issue
altogether by relying on relative "weights" of interests rather than on rules of appropria-
tion. For example, in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), the plaintiff was ordered to
cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar trees to prevent the spread of a plant
disease to nearby apple orchards. The Court stated that the societal values of the apple
growing industry was of higher weight than the ornamental or commercial value of the
cedars to the plaintiff. Id. at 279. The opinion is void of any analysis in terms of whether
a taking had occurred.
60. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 18.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 18-19.
63. See id. at 19.
64. See id. The theory illuminates the extent to which property owners suffer
grievous losses without some concomitant general public benefit deriving from the public
project. In that regard, the theory has some utility in the determination of the efficiency
of a project. See Michelman, supra note 27, at 1194, 1234-35. The determination that a
particular project is efficient despite the imposition of some burden on various individuals
lends an aura of legitimacy to the project. See id. at 1195. In a liberal democratic society,
the comparison of private rights on the one hand with benefits to society on the other hand
seems untenable because it suggests that some people in society are excluded from and
"counterpoised against" societal benefits. In other words, a group of people exists whose
interests are not included in "society's interests." Id. at 1194. Accordingly, the balancing
theory would be more valid in awarding compensation when a certain individual's private
losses are outweighed not by society's gains but by other peoples' gains. Id. at 1194.
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however, is best suited to deal with cases in which the argument for or
against compensation is obvious.
65
I. THE COMPENSABILITY OF THE EFFECTS OF CONDEMNATION ACTIVITIES
A. To Compensate or Not to Compensate
Courts have adopted various rationales in deciding to award or deny
compensation for losses suffered by a landowner as a result of the con-
demnation activities of a public body." Because of the diverse ap-
proaches taken by the courts in this area," and because of the differing
constitutional provisions that require compensation for certain of these
activities although not for others, 8 various arguments have been raised
in opposition to awarding compensation to various classes of landowners
who have felt the impact of the condemnation procedure.6' The propo-
nents of more liberal compensation awards have attempted to respond
to these arguments and at the same time have advanced arguments of
their own as to why compensation should be granted.10
Opponents of awarding compensation for losses suffered as a result of
condemnation activities have advanced five arguments. First, oppo-
nents fear that an award of compensation will open the doors of the
courtroom to a multitude of claims for losses only remotely connected
with condemnation activities.7 The resulting increased litigation costs
and the greater number of awards that will have to be paid by the
condemning authority, according to the opponents, would render re-
development projects so expensive that planning would have to be
postponed until such time as the money was available for immediate
condemnation of any property to be taken."
Second, opponents argue that the fear of such an increase in costs
would deter public agencies from announcing sufficiently in advance
any plans to condemn land for a public project or from releasing infor-
mation about the public project itself. 3 This "chilling effect" would
65. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 19.
66. See notes 103-32 infra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 103-50 infra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 167-97 infra and accompanying text.
69. See notes 71-82 infra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 83-98 infra and accompanying text.
71. See Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Commonwealth, 456 Pa. 384, 393, 321 A.2d 598, 602
(1974); 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1, at 5-8 (2d ed. 1953);
2A J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.44111], at 6-153 to -156 (rev.
3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as 2 A. NICHOLS]; Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Conse-
quential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REv. 437, 454 (1962); Van Alstyne, supra
note 15, at 33.
72. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 71, § 6.44111], at 6-156.
73. E.g., Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 51, 500 P.2d 1345, 1354, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 10 (1972); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 256, 269 N.E.2d
895, 904, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 358 (1971); see Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Commonwealth,
456 Pa. 384, 391, 321 A.2d 598, 601 (1974); Adams, supra note 1, at 240.
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interfere with the public's right of and interest in advance disclosure,
impeding public input into the plans being designed for the proposed
project.7
A third reason offered in opposition to the award of compensation is
that awarding compensation will interfere with legislative decision-
making. 5 According to this argument, permitting owners of uncon-
demned property to obtain compensation for losses suffered as a result
of condemnation activities would shift, in part, the decision to condemn
a particular parcel of property from the legislature to the citizen, hence
usurping the legislative function.7" This is true, according to the oppo-
nents, because the compensation award would broaden the scope of the
condemnation proceeding beyond that envisioned by the original plan-
ners."
A fourth reason offered for denying compensation is that an award to
landowners constitutes an unjust and arbitrary discrimination against
public land development in favor of private development. The propo-
nents of this argument view as perverse the fact that the availability of
damages turns on whether the taking was public or private;7 9 a land-
owner whose property was "taken" by way of a public hospital being
built next door, for example, would be entitled to compensation while a
landowner whose property was taken to the same extent by the building
of a private hospital would not. The result, therefore, is discrimination
against public developers in the form of costs of development higher
74. See Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 51, 500 P.2d 1345, 1354-55, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 10-11 (1972). In East Rutherford Indus. Park, Inc. v. State, 119 N.J. Super. 352,
291 A.2d 588 (Law Div. 1972), the court stated:
The public has an interest in keeping apprised of impending governmental
action. To that end, the press and government are granted untold liberty of
expression and reporting under the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. This public interest must take precedence over the possible and specu-
lative injury to property rights resulting from the freedom of expression and the
press. In a day when the right of government to suppress and classify informa-
tion which it deems vital to the nation's security is being seriously argued and
challenged, the plaintiff's alleged incidental damages pale into insignificance.
Id. at 361-62, 291 A.2d at 593 (citation omitted). The court held that allegations founded
on the publicity and announcements concerning the proposed site of a sports arena failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id.
75. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (constitutionally authorized legislation
not for Court to reappraise); Woodland Mkt. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d
955, 958-59 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing Berman); Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n,
66 Wis. 2d 720, 728-29, 226 N.W.2d 185, 189 (1975) (allowing damages in inverse condem-
nation action would preempt legislative function).
76. See Note, Condemnation Blight and the Abutting Landowner, 73 MICH. L. REV. 583,
602 (1975).
77. See id.
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than those experienced by private developers.
Finally, the opponents rely on tradition; in the past, courts consis-
tently have denied recovery to landowners of uncondemned property for
loss due to the effects of condemnation activity,8' considering such ef-
fects to be damnum absque injuria.82
Proponents of compensation for the effects of condemnation activities
have identified several pitfalls in the opponents' arguments. First, the
argument that awarding compensation will result in exhorbitant costs
for redevelopment projects presupposes that a denial of compensation
avoids costs. 3 In truth, the costs still exist; when compensation is de-
nied, the costs are reallocated to the landowner whose property has
diminished in value as a result of condemnation activities.8 '
Second, the fear that the threat of increased costs will deny the pub-
lic's right to know is unwarranted. Most public agencies are required to
seek public input prior to reaching a final decision about a condemna-
tion plan.8 At least theoretically, awarding compensation may force
public agencies to reach more cautious, realistic decisions about public
projects so as to avoid unnecessary condemnation costs.
In response to the argument that awarding compensation may shift
the legislative function, advocates of compensation emphasize that a
legislature does not have unbridled discretion in planning development
projects." Proponents of this position also point out that the decision-
81. See id. § 6.441, at 6-152 to -153; Spies & McCoid, supra note 71, at 449-50; cf. Luber
v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 278, 177 N.W.2d 380, 384 (1970) (rule of no recovery
for incidental or consequential damages in condemnation cases always prevailed in this
country).
82. See Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 282-83, 177 N.W.2d 380, 386
(1970); 2A NICHOLS, supra note 71, § 6.4432[1]. The term damnum absque injuria refers
to those damages for which no legal redress exists. See 47 Wis. 2d at 276-77, 177 N.W.2d
at 383. The Luber court concluded that, "[tihe rule making consequential damages
damnum absque injuria is, under modem constitutional interpretation, discarded ......
Id. at 283, 177 N.W.2d at 386.
83. See Kanner, supra note 3, at 785; Spies & McCoid, supra note 71, at 454; Note,
Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminution in Property Value as Compensable
Damage, 28 STAN. L. Rav. 779, 797 (1976).
84. See note 83 supra.
85. In Minnesota, for example, whenever a redevelopment project is to be undertaken,
the governing body must conduct a public hearing before the project can be approved.
See MINN. STAT. § 462.52(1) (1976).
86. Governmental units should have broad discretion in allocating social benefits and
burdens. See Note, supra note 76, at 602. In Minnesota, for example, the Legislature has
provided generous grants of condemnation power to public authorities for housing and
redevelopment in MINN. STAT. § 462.445(1) (1976), which states:
An authority shall be a public body. . . and shall have all the powers neces-
sary or convenient to carry out the purposes of [the housing and redevelopment
lawsl including the following powers in addition to others granted in these
sections:
(6) Within its area of operation to acquire real or personal property or any
[Vol. 5
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making body must consider the property interests of persons affected by
a decision reached by the body, and if the decision making body fails
to do so, the courts must rectify the failure. 7 Furthermore, nuisance
laws provide protection for the private landowner from a private devel-
opment's unjustifiable interference with the landowner's property
rights.88
The tradition argument has merit only when condemnation is viewed
in an historical context. When the condemnation procedure was first
utilized, the United States was largely agrarian and the impact of con-
demnation activities seldom extended beyond the boundaries of the
particular parcel being condemned." In today's modern, industrial
urban centers, however, condemnation seldom takes place without hav-
ing some impact on neighboring parcels.' 0
Beyond pointing out the weaknesses in the opponents' arguments, the
proponents offer two arguments supporting the grant of compensation
for losses from condemnation activities. The proponents' primary argu-
ment stresses the concept that no individual should be forced to bear a
disproportionate burden of the costs of public improvements." The cen-
interest therein by . . . the exercise of the power of eminent domain, . . . to
acquire real property which it may deem necessary for its purposes under these
sections, . . . [relating to providing adequate housing].
(7) Within its area of operation, and without the adoption of an urban re-
newal plan, to acquire, by all means as set forth in clause (6) of this subdivision,
including by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, . . . real property,
and to demolish, remove, rehabilitate or reconstruct the buildings and improve-
ments or construct new buildings and improvements thereon . . .; provided
that, real property with buildings or improvements thereon shall only be ac-
quired when the buildings or improvements are substandard; and provided
further that the exercise of the power of eminent domain under this clause shall
be limited to real property which contains buildings and improvements which
are vacated and substandard.
Id. In exercising its discretion, the government must take into consideration the protec-
tions of individual liberty against arbitrary governmental action, as provided by the
federal and state constitutions. See Note, supra note 76, at 602.
87. The United States Supreme Court emphasized the importance of securing adequate
protection for private property rights as follows: "In any society the fullness and suffi-
ciency of the securities which surround the individual in the use and enjoyment of his
property constitute one of the most certain tests of the character and value of the govern-
ment." Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893). Allowing
recovery for the effects of governmental action provides assurance to the landowner that
such protection will be afforded.
88. See 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 480, 481-82 (1978).
89. See Spies & McCoid, supra note 71, at 449-50.
90. See id. at 450.
91. Id. at 451; Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 32; see 72 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 1,
at 773. The extent to which a burden on an individual may be defined as fair is usually
taken to mean that people should pay for public improvements according to their ability
to pay, as with an income tax, or that all people should pay the same amount, as with a
sales tax, or that each person should pay only to the extent to which he benefits from an
improvement, as with a toll booth. Note, supra note 83, at 800.
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tral thesis behind decisions awarding compensation is that just as the
physical taking of property without compensation would be inherently
unfair so would be the denial of compensation to a landowner of uncon-
demned property that has been damaged but not taken when that land-
owner has sustained substantial and often times greater losses than an
owner of condemned property."2 These losses, according to the propo-
nents, should be shared equally by the general public who benefit from
the resulting improvements. 3
Second, the proponents argue that requiring compensation would pre-
vent the blatant injustice that would exist were the courts to permit a
governmental agency to depreciate the market value of private property
by threats of commencing a redevelopment project and then to take
advantage of the lower value of the property when it is ultimately con-
demned.94 According to the proponents, requiring compensation would
render useless a deliberate pattern of conduct by the public agency that
was designed to depreciate property values in order to acquire the prop-
erty for less than a fair value. 5 In the past, such tactics have varied from
blatant harassment to more subtle schemes such as denial of building
permits97 and oppressive zoning.9
92. See Spies & McCoid, supra note 71, at 438-39. In this same vein, the California
Supreme Court stated in Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943):
JAni improvement may be a great convenience to the public generally, but the
properties of the abutting owners ought not be sacrificed in order to secure
it. . . . The tendency under our system is too often to sacrifice the individual
to the community; and it seems very difficult in reason to show why the State
should not pay for property which it destroys or impairs the value, as well as
for what it physically takes.
Id. at 351, 144 P.2d at 823 (citations omitted).
93. Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (fifth amendment guarantee
of compensation for public taking designed to ensure that public burdens be borne by
public as a whole).
94. See United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961); Foster
v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 663 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir.
1968); Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 45 n.1, 500 P.2d 1345, 1350 n.1, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6 n.1 (1972); City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 317, 136 N.W.2d 896, 900
(1965); Note, Condemnation Blight: Uncompensated Losses in Eminent Domain Proceed-
ings-Is Inverse Condemnation the Answer?, 3 PAc. L.J. 571, 587 (1972).
95. See 8 NIcHoLS, supra note 4, § 14.02(31[a], at 14-13.
96. See Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 662 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (city informed
landowners that no compensation would be received for improvements, required special
conditions for issuance of building permits, and kept hIs pendens on property longer than
necessary), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); notes 223-26 infra and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 316-17, 136 N.W.2d 896, 900
(1965) (condemning authority allegedly sent letters to tenants, filed lis pendens, con-
ducted intense building inspections and issued citations for building code violations, and
refused to permit a long-established business to continue).
98. See, e.g., Long v. City of Highland Park, 329 Mich. 146, 154, 45 N.W.2d 10, 13
(19,50). While this argument strongly supports moving the valuation date back in condem-
nation proceedings to reflect the date of the de facto taking, it furnishes less support to
JVol. 5
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Basically, the compensability of the effects of condemnation proceed-
ings is an issue in three situations. The most common situation occurs
when the condemning authority actually has acquired the property
through condemnation." In those situations the court's focus is upon the
date to be used in determining the property's value, that is, whether the
property should be valued as of the date of the actual taking or at some
prior date.N The two remaining situations both arise when the con-
demning authority has not formally exercised its powers of condemna-
tion and therefore has not acquired the property. In one category are
situations in which the property was scheduled to be taken but the
urban renewal project was abandoned before the acquisition had taken
place.' The other category is comprised of cases in which the property
was never scheduled to be taken but the property abuts the area un-
dergoing redevelopment and, as a result, has diminished in value. 02 The
extent to which the landowners in these three situations are compen-
sated for losses caused by the urban renewal projects will be examined.
B. Property Acquired by the State
Courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue of the extent
the landowner whose property is not yet condemned, and even less support for abutting
landowners whose property was never scheduled to be taken. It would be economically
unreasonable and inefficient to force the condemning authority to acquire property it does
not want or need, or, in the case of abutting property, land it never intended to take. This
assumes the public authority abandons the project in good faith and thus does not avail
itself of the benefits of a lower condemnation price obtained for the property. On the other
hand, an interference with property rights is not measured by the value accruing to the
public agency but by the extent of the loss sustained by the property owner. See Luber v.
Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 279, 177 N.W.2d 380, 384 (1970). The mere fact that
the project was abandoned should not automatically insulate the condemning authority
from liability for the effects of its activities. See Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City
of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 115-16, 343 A.2d 408, 412 (1975). Awarding such damages for
condemned property is inconsistent with denying recovery for uncondemned property. See
id. at 120-21, 343 A.2d at 415; Note, supra note 76, at 601.
99. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 662-63 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd,
405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d
790 (1961); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 255, 269 N.E.2d 895, 903,
321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 357 (1971); City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190
N.E.2d 52 (1963).
100. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 533, 190 N.E.2d 52,
57 (1963).
101. See, e.g., Hamer v. State Highway Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d 869, 872-73 (Mo. 1957);
Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 110, 343 A.2d 408, 410
(1975); cf. Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 305 Minn. 336, 340, 232 N.W.2d 923, 926
(1975) (per curiam) (plaintiff's apartment building inspected by housing authority to
determine evidence of blight and deterioration, but property never approved for acquisi-
tion by authorities).
102. See, e.g., Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64, 69-70 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 837 (1974); Woodland Mkt. Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955, 959
(6th Cir. 1970).
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of compensation to be awarded for the effects of precondemnation activ-
ity when the property is actually condemned by a governmental author-
ity. Some courts preclude any recovery for such losses;191 some grant
recovery under a condemnation blight theory;"" others award com-
pensation based on a de facto taking analysis.1'
Traditionally, compensation for condemned property has been
awarded based on the property's market value on the date of the actual
taking. 06 This method of valuation ignores any effect that the govern-
ment's project has had on the value of the property. 07 Courts that apply
date-of-taking valuation rely on the physical invasion theory of compen-
sation.'"9 In determining just compensation for condemned land, these
courts consistently have excluded recovery for diminution in property
value caused by the precondemnation activities of the condemning au-
103. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Lands, 47 F. Supp. 934, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
Weintraub v. Flood Control Dist., 104 Ariz. 566, 570, 456 P.2d 936, 939 (1969) (declaratory
judgment); Housing Auth. v. Schroeder, 222 Ga. 417, 419, 151 S.E.2d 226, 227 (1966);
Land Clearance for Redev. Auth. v. Morrison, 457 S.W.2d 185, 198 (Mo. 1970) (valuations
do not include depreciation in value prior to condemnation absent "inordinate" delay);
Sorbino v. City of New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 554, 569, 129 A,2d 473, 481 (Law Div.
1957) (designation of an area as "blighted" neither constitutes present nor future taking
of property); Fisher v. City of Syracuse, 46 A.D.2d 216, 217, 361 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775-76
(1974), motion for leave to appeal denied, 36 N.Y.2d 642, 329 N.E.2d 676, 368 N.Y.S.2d
1025, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975); City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700, 704-
05 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (the threat of condemnation is an incidental, noncompensable
damage), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
104. See, e.g., Uvodich v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 9 Ariz. App. 400, 405-06, 453 P.2d
229, 235-36 (1969); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 255-58, 269 N.E.2d
895, 904-05, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 357-60 (1971); In re Bunner, 28 Ohio Misc. 165, 170-71, 276
N.E.2d 677, 681-82 (P. Ct. 1971); Lange v. State, 86 Wash. 2d 585, 593, 547 P.2d 282, 287
(1976); notes 113-18 infra and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367, 371 (E.D. Mich.
1970); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 665-66 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d
138 (6th Cir. 1968); Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 345-47, 355 A.2d 307, 314-15
(1974); City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 317-18, 136 N.W.2d 896,900 (1965); notes
119-32 infra and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 283-84 (1939); Housing & Redev.
Auth. v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 410, 96 N.W.2d 673, 683 (1959); Minneapolis-St. Paul
Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 449, 277 N.W. 394, 398 (1937) (quoting from
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)); 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 12.23. This
traditional view, that property values are to be determined as of the date of the tak-
ing-that is, the date suit was commenced or possession or control was taken, whichever
came first-prevailed until 1943. See 8 NIcHoLs, supra note 4, § 14.02141. In 1943 the
United States Supreme Court announced a new policy in the landmark decision of United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). For a discussion of Miller, see note 114 infra.
107. The rationale for this method of valuation was announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), in
which the Court stated that compensation accounts only for those expenses reflected in
the market value of the property at the time of the taking. Id. at 341.
108. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text.
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thority,10 the condemnor's activities being considered as only one of the
"myriad influences" on market values." 0 But serious inequities can be
associated with compensating landowners only to the extent of property
values that have diminished as a result of the renewal project."' Accord-
ingly, the majority of courts today no longer ignore the negative impact
of the condemnation on the market values of condemned property in
determining what is just compensation to be paid to the landowner."'
The loss of property value caused by precondemnation activities of
the condemning authority often is referred to as condemnation blight,"'
while precondemnation activity that results in an increase in property
values is referred to as project enhancement."' Addressing the issue of
109. See, e.g., Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939) (reduction in value
caused by beginning of project considered mere incident of ownership). One authority has
stated that "[under a strict 'taking' approach, the owner whose lot is one of the last
acquired will be forced to absorb the decline in market value which usually accompanies
such piecemeal condemnation." 8 NicHoLs, supra note 4, § 14.02[1][a], at 14-11.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Lands, 47 F. Supp. 934, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
This rationale assumes that property ownership is always subject to the risk of condemna-
tion by the government; therefore, ownership under the pendency of a proposed project
varies only in degree from the ownership of the general public. 8 NicsoLs, supra note 4, §
14.02[2]; see, e.g., Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939).
111. See Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 665 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); &NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 14.02[1l, at 14-10. If a landowner is
not compensated for the extent that his property has diminished in value as a result of
condemnation activities, he is, in effect, forced to bear a proportionately larger burden of
the project's costs than that borne by the general public. Note, supra note 94, at 593.
"There is no logic or justice in a system of property acquisition that would allow a con-
demnor to announce that an offensive type of public project is to be built and then wait
until the adverse news causes property values to fall, then step in and acquire the proper-
ties at the depressed values." Id.
112. See note 117 infra and accompanying text. In the case of In re Bunner, 28 Ohio
Misc. 165, 171, 276 N.E.2d 677, 681 (P. Ct. 1971), the court held that Bunner's property,
which had been condemned, was to be valuated at a date prior to the time its value
diminished as a result of the public knowledge of a proposed freeway. Id. at 180, 276
N.E.2d at 686-87. The court stated:
The damage which is inflicted upon property subject to condemnation for a long
period of time is not necessarily the fault of anyone. Damage to property which
is the subject of condemnation for a long period of time is often inevitable. It
may be the fault of no one. Nevertheless, it occurs. And when it does occur, the
owner is not made to suffer that damage.
Id. at 178, 276 N.E.2d at 686 (emphasis in original).
113. See 4 NicHoLs, supra note 2, § 12.3151[5], at 12-475.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943). Depending on the
nature of the public project, property values might increase in one situation and decrease
in another situation. For example, the construction of a public recreation facility might
result in an increase in the market value of surrounding property. See, e.g., Merced
Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971)
(enlargement of lake for recreational facilities caused increase in nearby property market
values). On the other hand, the construction of a public sewage disposal plant would
probably have the opposite effect. See, e.g., City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321,
324, 69 N.W.2d 909, 912 (1955) (sewage disposal plant caused reduction in market value
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whether condemnation activity should be a factor in determining just
compensation, the United States Supreme Court has stated that neither
the condemnor nor the property owner should benefit from the effects
of condemnation."5 The condemnor should not be allowed to avail itself
of lower property values resulting from its own activities, and the prop-
erty owner should not be permitted to benefit from an increase in prop-
erty values from project enhancement."8 Most courts, including those
in Minnesota, maintain similar philosophies, permitting the landowner
whose property is condemned to establish the property's value as of the
time of the actual taking but as if the debilitating effects of the "cloud
of condemnation" had not occurred."' Thus, when a landowner's prop-
of adjoining property). The former situation results in project enhancement whereas the
latter situation results in project blight. If a strict "taking" approach were applied, the
landowner whose property has depreciated in value could receive only the depreciated
amount because that would be the present value at the time of the taking. However, if a
strict taking approach is to be applied consistently, the landowner whose property value
has appreciated from project enhancement would be compensated according to that
higher value, that is, the present value at the time of the taking. Obviously, the govern-
ment would not be disposed to bear the added burden of such windfall recoveries. Accord-
ingly, in Miller the Court held that the landowner whose property had appreciated in
value during the pendency of the condemnation proceedings was not entitled to be com-
pensated for the enhanced value of his property; rather, he was entitled to be compensated
only for the value of his property at the time the government finalized the project plans.
See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943). The result in Miller is reasonable
in light of the potential for intense land speculation resulting in onerous property value
increases that must be absorbed by the government. See id. at 377. The United States
Supreme Court, however, was slow to see the opposite side of the coin: if a landowner is
not allowed to reap the benefits from the positive effects a project has on his property,
the government should not be allowed to benefit from the negative effects on the prop-
erty's value. The Court ultimately came to that conclusion, but not until nearly eighteen
years after Miller, in United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 635-36
(1961). See note 115 infra and accompanying text.
115. Compare United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943) (enhancement in value
excluded from condemnation award) with United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961) (award "must exclude any depreciation in value caused by the
prospective taking once the Government 'was committed' to the project").
116. See note 115 supra.
117. See City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 318, 136 N.W.2d 896, 900 (1965)
(neither condemnor nor landowner should benefit from effects of condemnation); State v.
Anderson, 293 Minn. 455, 458-59, 197 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1972) (increase in property value
excluded from compensation); Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Minneapolis Metro. Co., 273
Minn. 256, 262-63, 141 N.W.2d 130, 136 (1966) (any increase or decrease in property value
from public improvement not to be considered in determining property value of con-
demned land); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 257-58, 269 N.E.2d
895, 905, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 359 (1971) (where true condemnation blight exists, landowner
entitled to show value of condemned property prior to onset of blight); In re Bunner, 28
Ohio Misc. 165, 171, 276 N.E.2d 677, 681 (P. Ct. 1971) ("The property is to be valued
independent of any effect related to the proposed project.") (emphasis in original). But
see United States v. 3.66 Acres of Land, 426 F. Supp. 533, 537 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (just
compensation restricted to value of defendant's property on date of trial); Housing Auth.
v. Schroeder, 222 Ga. 417, 419, 151 S.E.2d 226, 227 (1966) (jury cannot consider date for
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erty is condemned, just compensation should be awarded as if the prop-
erty had not been subject to the condemnation activity,"" regardless of
whether the condemnation activity resulted in a decreased or increased
property value.
An alternative approach to the valuation of condemned land utilized
by a few courts has given rise to the concept of de facto taking.'" This
concept is premised on the idea that prior to the transfer of legal title
and taking of possession by the government, the property owner is
"stripped of the incidents of ownership,"'' 20 being left with property that
cannot be sold, leased, or used. 2' A de facto taking creates in the con-
demning authority an interest in property equivalent to that accom-
plished by the transfer of title in a condemnation proceeding.2 2 In con-
demnation proceedings, this concept may be used to alter the date for
determining the compensation award. 2 3 For both the condemnation
compensation other than date of taking); Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Lamar, 21 111. 2d 362,
368-69, 172 N.E.2d 790, 793-94 (1961) (date of taking may not be prior to filing petition
for condemnation); St. Louis Hous. Auth. v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Mo. 1964)
(damages caused by condemning authority not included in damage award).
118. See City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 255, 269 N.E.2d 895, 903,
321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 357 (1971).
119. See, e.g., Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich.
1970); City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965). The label de facto
distinguishes this form of taking from a de jure taking in which the appropriation results
from the formalized exercise of the government's eminent domain powers. See 72 COLUM.
L. REv., supra note 1, at 774.
120. 72 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 1, at 774.
121. Id. "At some point in this stripping process a taking occurs, and compensation is
then due." Id. A rationale for the concept of de facto taking was stated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court as follows:
When the government interferes with a person's right to possession and enjoy-
ment of his property to such an extent so as to create a 'taking' in the constitu-
tional sense, a right to compensation vests in the person owning the property at
the time of such interference. This right has the status of property . . . .The
theory is that where the government interferes with a person's property to such
a substantial extent, the owner has lost a part of his interest in the real property.
Substituted for the property loss is the right to compensation.
Brooks Inv. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 305 Minn. 305, 315, 232 N.W.2d 911, 918 (1975).
122. See Brooks Inv. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 305 Minn. 305, 319, 232 N.W.2d 911,
920 (1975).
123. See, e.g., Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich.
1970) (date altered from 1965 to 1962); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.
Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138, 147 (6th Cir. 1968) (damages for lost rents between onset
of condemnation blight and the formal taking not permitted; valuation date altered from
date of de jure condemnation in 1963 to date condemning authority's actions had a
"substantial effect" on the property in 1954); City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311,
317-20, 136 N.W.2d 896, 900-01 (1965) (remand for the jury to determine when the taking
occurred); City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 533, 190 N.E.2d 52, 57 (1963)
(date of valuation is date immediately before the city "took active steps ...which to
any extent depreciated the value of the property.").
The use of the de facto taking approach is well illustrated in Foster v. City of Detroit,
19791
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blight and the de facto taking approaches, the desired result is to secure
full compensation for the owner. The former approach, however, in-
254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968). In Foster, the court
focused on the adverse effect on the landowner's property of the precondemnation activi-
ties of various city officials. See 254 F. Supp. at 662. These actions of the city officials
included:
[Ilnforming the plaintiffs that they would receive no compensation for im-
provements and that they were only to keep the roof on and the water running,
requiring the signing of a (waiver of any claim to the increased value of the
property] as a condition precedent to the issuance of a building permit, ..,.
actually completing the condemnation and clearance of several blocks in the
area, requiring the razing of many vandalized buildings, and keeping jal lis
pendens in effect for five years after the Public Hearing Administration had
issued a stop order on the project, all the while telling those who inquired that
the property would be condemned soon.
Id. The court also noted that the lis pendens, itself, impaired property sales, thus reducing
sales prices and values. Id. Although the condemning authority commenced condemna-
tion proceedings in 1950, the proceedings were discontinued in 1955 pursuant to a stop
order issued by the federal government. Plans for another development project were ap-
proved in 1961, and, subsequently, the plaintiff's property was acquired. See id. at 659.
When the initial proceedings were commenced, the plaintiff's property was fully rented.
See id. at 660. After 1954, when several blocks adjacent to plaintiff's property were con-
demned and razed, the plaintiff suffered a loss of tenants; only one of the plaintiff's four
apartments was rented, and that one at a much lower rental. Id. at 666. In addition, as
the exodus of people within the area continued, vandalism increased to such an extent
that the police refused to investigate. The plaintiff could no longer obtain insurance on
the property. At the same time, the city demanded that the owner either put the buildings
in safe condition or demolish them at the owner's expense. See id. at 660.
The Foster court found that the actions of the city officials and the ensuing protracted
delay in condemning the property at least "substantially contributed to, hastened and
aggravated the deterioration and decline in value of the area in general and of plaintiff's
property in particular." Id. at 662. The court concluded that the city's actions constituted
a taking of the plaintiff's property as of 1954, when the plaintiff could no longer rent most
of his property, although the actual condemnation did not occur until 1961. See id. Thus,
because the condemning authority was forced to purchase the property at the property's
market value as of 1954, that is, before the authority's activities depressed the property's
value. Therefore, the condemning authority was not permitted to take advantage of the
depressed property values that had been caused by its own activities. See id.
While a finding of a de facto taking results in altering the date for the determination of
the value of condemned property, when the property has not been condemned, a finding
of a de facto taking results in the forced acquisition of the landowner's property by the
government. See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d
1327, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1977) (agency's interference with landowner's property caused
substantial reduction in market value of property such that agency's interference effected
a compensable taking under the fifth and fourteenth amendments); Lincoln Loan Co. v.
State Highway Comm'n, 274 Or. 49, 56-57, 545 P.2d 105, 109 (1976) (activity of defendant
over 10-year period that substantially interfered with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of
property constituted valid cause of action in inverse condemnation).
In the past, courts have required a formalized transfer before compensation is ordered,
whereas in recent years, courts have expanded on the theory of constructive taking, that
is, de facto taking. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966),
aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d
896 (1965); Hazelton Redev. Auth. v. Hudock, 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 670, 674-75, 281 A.2d
914, 917 (1971). This trend has given rise to a cause of action labelled "inverse condemna-
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volves the rules of appropriation, whereas the latter approach uses the
rules of evidence. 21
The de facto taking approach bears some resemblance to the condem-
nation blight approach. 2 5 In recent years courts have considered
whether, in certain situations, a condemning authority's conduct consti-
tutes a de facto taking or condemnation blight. 2' The de facto taking
approach maintains that at some date prior to the actual transfer of
ownership,' the condemnor's activity substantially interfered with the
landowner's enjoyment of his property; 2 8 the date of valuation therefore
is moved back to reflect the date of the constructive taking."' The con-
demnation blight approach, on the other hand, retains the date of the
actual taking as the date of valuation but allows compensation to the
landowner for loss that is traceable to serious value-depressive activity
by the condemning authority.1'3 Although both avenues of relief offer
protection to the landowner against depreciation in value resulting from
the condemnor's actions, condemnation blight only accounts for de-
creases in the fair market value of property, whereas a de facto taking
also accounts for rental losses and causes interest on the condemnation
award, payable by the condemnor, to accrue from a date prior to the
actual taking.'3 ' Thus, while the condemnation blight approach only
accounts for loss in value, the de facto taking approach also accounts
tion," which is brought against a governmental agency to recover the value of property
"taken" by the agency, although the agency has not formally commenced eminent domain
proceedings against the property owner. For a description of the term "inverse condemna-
tion," see Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 477, 216 N.W.2d 651,
657 (1974); Lincoln Loan Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 274 Or. 49, 51 n.1, 545 P.2d 105,
106 n.1 (1976). The reason the action is "inverse" is that the proceedings are initiated by
the property owner rather than the governmental agency. See Feder & Wieland, Inverse
('ondemnation-A Viable Alternative, 51 DEN. L.J. 529, 529 (1974).
124. City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 254, 269 N.E.2d 895, 903, 321
N.Y.S.2d 345, 356 (1971).
125. See 4 NicHoLs, supra note 2, § 12.3151[5]. Both concepts are concerned with
valuation and dates for valuation, and are aimed at altering some process in the condem-
nation procedure in order to account for the effects of condemnation. The de facto taking
approach alters the date of the taking whereas the condemnation blight approach alters
the date for valuation. See id. at 12-476.
126. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 256-58, 269 N.E.2d
895, 904-05, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 358-59 (1971). See generally 4 NicHoLs, supra note 2, §
12.3151[5].
127. A de jure or actual transfer refers to a formalized acquisition by the condemning
authority. See 72 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 1, at 774.
128. For a discussion of substantial interference with the landowner's enjoyment, see
Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 487, 216 N.W.2d 651, 662
(1974); notes 238-50 infra and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 12.3151[5], at 12-475; 1973 URB. L. ANN. 343,
344; cases cited in note 123 supra.
130. See City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 254-55, 269 N.E.2d 895,
903, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 356-57 (1971); 4 NIcHoLs, supra note 2, § 12.3151[5), at 12-475.
131. See 4 NIcHoLs, supra note 2, § 12.3151[51, at 12-500.
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for loss of use. 32
Confusion over what should constitute a de facto taking and what
should be considered condemnation blight has created controversy in
eminent domain proceedings. 3 In City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement
Co.,'3' the New York Court of Appeals determined when a condemning
authority's conduct results in a de facto taking. The actual condemna-
tion of the property occurred in 1966.'3 In Clement, the trial court found
that the conduct by the condemning authority, including its protracted
delay, 13 destroyed the value of the property to Clement Co., 37 that the
property was no longer of any utility, 3 and that the company had been
forced, by the threat of condemnation, to move its printing operation
to a new location.3 9 The trial court concluded that the condemning
authority's actions constituted a de facto taking of Clement Co.'s prop-
erty as of April 1, 1963. 4" The New York Court of Appeals modified the
award, finding no de facto taking. 4 ' The court emphasized that the city
did not, by its actions or communications, interfere with or seek to gain
any control over the property. The city merely had manifested an inten-
tion to condemn." '2 The court held that "the mere announcement of
impending condemnations, coupled as it may well be with substantial
delay and damage, does not, in the absence of other acts which may be
translated into an exercise of dominion and control by the condemning
authority, constitute a taking so as to warrant awarding compensa-
tion. 1" 3 Therefore, under the court's construction, "a de facto taking
132. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 255, 269 N.E.2d 895,
903, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 357 (1971); 1973 URB. L. ANN., supra note 129, at 344.
133. See generally 4 NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 12.3151[5].
134. 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971).
135. See id. at 251-52, 269 N.E.2d at 901, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
136. A span of approximately nine years passed between the time the city first informed
Clement about the condemnation until the actual condemnation proceedings were
brought. See id. at 248-51, 269 N.E.2d at 899-901, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 351-54.
137. See id. at 252, 269 N.E.2d at 901, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 354-55. Publicity of the contem-
plated condemnation was widespread. Vacancies and conditions of disrepair were common
throughout the subject area, and property values decreased drastically by reason of the
threat of condemnation. See id. at 249, 269 N.E.2d at 900, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
138. After 1963, Clement Co. could not sell the property nor rent it, even for a short-
term lease. Meanwhile, Clement Co. continued to pay taxes and insurance on the prop-
erty. Id.
139. Throughout the 10-year period during which Clement Co.'s property was under a
threat of condemnation, Clement Co. received several official communications confirming
the eventual condemnation of its property, and was advised by the city to relocate its
facilities. See id. at 248-49, 269 N.E.2d at 899, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 351-52. The company
completed its move to a new plant by April, 1963. Id. at 249, 269 N.E.2d at 899, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 352.
140. Id. at 252, 269 N.E.2d at 901-02, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
141. See id. at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 257, 269 N.E.2d at 904, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 359 (emphasis in original).
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requires a physical entry by the condemnor, a physical ouster of the
owner, a legal interference with the physical use, possession or enjoy-
ment of the property, or a legal interference with the owner's power of
disposition of the property.""'
Clement Co. was not deserted totally by the court, however. The court
acknowledged that a property owner might receive severely diminished
compensation because of decreased market values resulting from con-
demnation blight. To alleviate this inequity, the court suggested that
the owner introduce evidence of the market value of the condemned land
before "the onslaught of the 'affirmative value-depressive acts'" of the
city."' The Clement analysis, therefore, accounts for the effects of con-
demnation blight by adjusting the amount of compensation to be
awarded to the landowner pursuant to the condemnation proceedings.
The landowner receives the same amount for the condemned property
as would have been received had condemnation blight not occurred prior
to the actual taking. Clement clearly refuses to alter the taking date of
condemned property absent some direct legal restraint or physical inva-
sion. 7 This position echoes that taken by the United States Supreme
Court, which has stated: "A reduction or increase in the value of prop-
erty may occur by reason of legislation for or the beginning or comple-
tion of a project. Such changes in value are incidents of ownership. They
cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense.","
144. Id. at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 357 (emphasis in original).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 258, 269 N.E.2d at 905, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 359. As stated by the Clement Court:
[Clompensation shall be based on the value of the property as it would have
been at the time of the de jure taking, but for the debilitating threat of condem-
nation. This, in turn, requires only that there be present some proof of affirma-
tive acts causing a decrease in value and difficulty in arriving at a value using
traditional methods.
Id. at 258, 269 N.E.2d at 905, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted). Because the evidence introduced to make this determination was insufficient,
a new trial was ordered for the taking of such evidence. See id. at 258, 269 N.E.2d at 905,
321 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
147. See id. at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 357. A significant motivation
for the Clement court was the large amount of money involved and the fact that the
landowner had reasons, apart from the threat of condemnation, to relocate his successfully
ongoing business. See id. at 250, 269 N.E.2d at 900, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 353. Had the court
affirmed a finding of a de facto taking, in effect moving back the date of appropriation to
April 1, 1963, interest on the award of approximately $460,000 would have been owed to
Clement Co. See id. at 254, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 356-57. The court empha-
sized that awarding such an amount would impose an unwarranted burden on the con-
demning authority, in effect penalizing the city for notifying Clement Co. in advance as
to the condemnation, thereby fostering governmental secrecy. See id. at 256, 269 N.E.2d
at 904, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 358. Clement is a typical example of those decisions precluding a
finding of a de facto taking, based on the fear that such recovery would impede urban
renewal and encourage clandestine planning. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying
text.
148. Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939).
19791
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Determining compensation for the injurious impact of precondemna-
tion activities on condemned land by means of a de facto taking as
opposed to a condemnation blight analysis affects only the amount of
compensation. A de facto taking analysis considers certain losses that a
condemnation blight analysis ignores, such as interest and loss of rent.4 9
Moreover, when the property ultimately is not condemned and yet suf-
fers diminution in value from the condemning authority's activities, the
distinction between condemnation blight and de facto taking gives rise
to an even more serious result; the manner in which a particular court
resolves the dichotomy may determine whether a landowner receives
"just" compensation or no compensation at all.'
C. Property Not Acquired by the State
Two increasingly common situations exist in which landowners of
uncondemned property suffer the impact of condemnation activity. In
one situation, the property never is condemned because the project itself
is abandoned. In the other situation, the property is not condemned
because it never was included within the area to be condemned, al-
though it abuts the area. Thus, the question arises as to what extent the
losses suffered by the property owners in these two categories are com-
pensable.
1. When the Project is Abandoned
Redevelopment projects are abandoned for a number of reasons. 5 '
The most obvious barrier to the completion of a project is inadequate
financing. 52 Often, the condemnation procedure is drawn out over a
period of several years while properties in a selected area are condemned
on a piecemeal basis as funds become available.'53 As a result, the pro-
149. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
150. See notes 151-66 infra and accompanying text.
151. The right of a condemning authority to abandon condemnation proceedings
generally is recognized. See 8 NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 14.02[1][b]. The right is often
conferred by statute. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-408 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978);
WiS. STAT. ANN. § 32.06(9) (West 1973), as amended by Act of June 6, 1978, ch. 438, § 9,
1977-1978 Wis. Legis. Serv. 2519 (West), as amended by Act of June 6, 1978, ch. 440, § 6,
1977-1978 Wis. Legis. Serv. 2524 (West). In other jurisdictions, including Minnesota, the
right to abandon is allowed under the common law. See, e.g., State v. Myhra G.M.C.
Truck & Equip. Co., 254 Minn. 17, 18-19, 93 N.W.2d 204, 205 (1958). The common law
right to abandon is based on the theory that the condemning authority has no right to
possession and the landowner has no right to compensation until the entry of judgment.
See, e.g., County of Hennepin v. Mikulay, 292 Minn. 200, 212-13, 194 N.W.2d 259, 266-
67 (1972) (impermissible to abandon after landowner surrendered possession, condemnor
accepted possession, and landowner accepted amount condemnor deposited with clerk).
152. See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327,
1330 (9th Cir. 1977); Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 305 Minn. 336, 338, 232 N.W.2d
923, 925 (1975) (per curiam).
153. See, e.g., Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 305 Minn. 336, 337-38, 232 N.W.2d
[Vol. 5
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ject's financing frequently runs out before the last parcels of land can
be appropriated.'"4 A landowner therefore may be left with property that
is worthless or that has diminished in value. In other situations, after
an extended period of public announcements and other planning activi-
ties, the public authority alters the location of its project, abandoning
the previous site.1'5 Again, the remaining uncondemned parcels may
suffer diminution in value.
2. Property Abutting Redevelopment Projects
The effects of condemnation activities do not stop at the boundaries
of the redevelopment area. Property abutting the area undergoing re-
development may suffer many of the same losses sustained by property
within the project's boundaries.' 6 Losses may result from the initial
planning procedure: the project's specific perimeters may be vague and
the precise amount of land to be taken may be unknown.'57 Such uncer-
tainty can depress the land values of many parcels that ultimately will
not be scheduled for condemnation; when condemnation is imminent,
property may have less value to the buying public.5 9 Once the area to
be condemned is specifically defined, the effects of condemnation may
spread throughout the neighborhood and spill over onto abutting prop-
erty.
6 0
Commentators, as well as courts, have focused on the issue of compen-
sation for loss to property that was originially slated for appropriation. 6"
The same principles that apply in those situations, however, also
923, 924-25 (1975) (per curiam); Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton,
68 N.J. 107, 111-12, 343 A.2d 408, 409-10 (1975).
154. See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327,
1330 (9th Cir. 1977).
155. See, e.g., Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 112,
343 A.2d 408, 410 (1975); Reingold v. Urban Redev. Auth., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 266, 268,
341 A.2d 915, 916 (1975).
156. See, e.g., Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64, 69 (6th Cir.) (redevelopment
project caused decrease in value of nearby property), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974);
Foster v. Herley, 491 F.2d 174, 176 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (public project resulted
in loss of congregation and lowered property value of church); Woodland Mkt. Realty Co.
v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 1970) (condemnation and razing of
adjacent property lowered market value of property and caused commercial tenants to
leave); Note, supra note 76, at 583.
157. See 4 NICHoLS, supra note 2, § 12.3151[21; Note, supra note 76.
158. See Note, supra note 76, at 584.
159. See id. at 584-85.
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327
(9th Cir. 1977); Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 305 Minn. 336, 232 N.W.2d 923 (1975)
(per curiam); Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d
408 (1975); Reingold v. Urban Redev. Auth., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 266, 341 A.2d 915 (1975);
Adams, supra note 1; Kanner, supra note 3; Note, supra note 94. But see Note, supra note
76.
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should apply to abutting property.' 2 Jurisdictions that deny compen-
sation to landowners whose property sustained loss resulting from an
abandoned project would most likely deny compensation to abutting
property owners; the decisions awarding compensation in the former
category would be more likely to support recovery in the latter cate-
gory. 163 Courts have distinguished situations in which property abuts
condemned property from those in which the loss accrues to a parcel
of land from which a segment was taken.1' In the latter category, any
loss of utility to the remaining parcel resulting from the partial taking
must be compensated. 6 5 When the property suffers a loss in value
merely because of its proximity to condemned property, however, the
landowner will not be compensated unless he can prove that his prop-
erty sustained some form of injury more significant than that suffered
by the general public. 6
D. Constitutional Protections
Every state constitution, with one exception, provides individuals
with some form of protection against the uncompensated taking of pri-
vate property for a public use."7 In addition, the constitutions in many
162. In Minnesota, the courts have acknowledged that property abutting a public pro-
ject may suffer damages within the meaning of the Minnesota Constitution, entitling the
owner to compensation. For example, in City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 69
N.W.2d 909 (1955), the city condemned a portion of the plaintiff's property for a main
sewer line and a portion of another tract of plaintiff's land adjacent to a proposed sewage
disposal site. The plaintiff brought an action for damages to remaining portions of both
tracts, claiming that the proximity to the sewage disposal plant caused a reduction in the
market value of the remaining uncondemned portions. The court stated that when the
taking and use of adjoining property causes damage to an owner's land and those damages
are peculiar to that adjoining landowner, that is, different from the type of injury suffered
by the general public, then those damages are compensable. See id. at 325, 69 N.W.2d at
912.
163. The causation factor regarding diminution in value of abutting property is more
tenuous than that of property in an abandoned project. Abutting property suffers more of
an indirect form of damage because the condemnation activities were supposedly aimed
at other property. Consequently, if a court fails to hold a condemnor liable for damages
to property it once may have intended to take, that same court would not be apt to award
damages for property the condemnor never intended to take.




167. See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 18; MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. 1,
20; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7; OHIo CONST. art. 1, § 19; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10; Wis. CONST.
art. 1, § 13; 2 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.1[3] (rev. 3d ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as 2 NIcHoLS]. The one exception is North Carolina. In that state
the constitution does not have an explicit constitutional prohibition against uncompen-
sated takings for public use. The constitution does have an equal protection clause, see
N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19, that has been interpreted by the North Carolina courts as
requiring compensation for takings. See De Bruhl v. State Highway & Pub. Works
Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 675-76, 102 S.E.2d 229, 232-33 (1958).
[Vol. 5
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states also provide protection against the uncompensated damaging of
private property.'" The specific constitutional provision in a particular
jurisdiction helps to establish the perimeters within which landowners
can expect to be compensated."'9
1. "Taking" Only Provisions
In jurisdictions that have constitutional provisions that protect land-
owners only against uncompensated takings of private property, a
court must find a taking before awarding compensation." Therefore,
when property has not been acquired by the condemning authority,
courts are forced to find that the equivalent of a "taking" has oc-
curred.'' In other words, an action to recover the property's diminished
168. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 15; MINN. CONST. art. 1, §
13; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
169. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 252-53, 269 N.E.2d
895, 902, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 355 (1971) ("Both the Federal and State Constitutions provide
in sum, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This, of course, marks only the beginning of the inquiry, as the nicer questions relating to
precisely what constitutes a taking, as well as just compensation in the constitutional
sense remain to be determined.").
170. The language found in the various constitutions prohibiting "takings" of private
property without just compensation implicitly requires such compensation only where a
taking has occurred, as opposed to the existence of some lesser injury. See, e.g., MICH.
CONST. art. 10, § 2. Accordingly, in such jurisdictions, where a landowner suffers an injury
less than a "taking" of his property, he has no redress under the constitution.
171. See City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 253, 269 N.E.2d 895, 902,
321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 355 (1971). In Clement, because the court found that no de facto taking
had occurred prior to the de jure taking, the damages from the condemnation blight by
themselves were not compensable. See id. at 253, 269 N.E.2d at 902, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
If the property had not been condemned, Clement Co. would not have been entitled to
compensation for those damages. Cf. id. at 256-57, 269 N.E.2d at 904, 321 N.Y.S.2d at
358-59 (some federal and other jurisdictions do recognize a de facto taking absent physical
invasion or direct legal restraint). Because the property had been condemned, however,
the damages could be based on market value at the de jure taking plus value denied the
owner because of "affirmative value-depressing acts" of the condemnor. See id. at 2,58,
269 N.E.2d at 905, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
In Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408
(1975), the court held that when the threat of condemnation destroys the beneficial use
that a landowner has made of his property, a taking has occurred. See id. at 122, 343 A.2d
at 416. In comparison, the California Supreme Court, in the case of Klopping v. City of
Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972), held that a property owner
can obtain compensation for a measurable diminution in market value caused by the
unreasonable acts, including unreasonable delays, of the condemning authority. See id.
at 51-52, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The Washington Market court concluded
that its holding was more narrow than the Klopping court's holding because the New
Jersey Constitution only prohibited takings without compensation, whereas the California
Constitution provided for just compensation when property has been "taken or damaged."
See Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. at 122 & n.9, 343 A.2d
at 416 & n.9. The California court could compensate a measurable diminution whereas
the New Jersey court required a destruction of the property's beneficial use.
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market value will not succeed unless the activities of the condemning
authority amount to a de facto taking.
Judicial interpretation of just compensation provisions has given rise
to an expanded construction of the concepts of "property" and "taking."
The term "property" connotes more than a mere physical entity.'
7 2 It
"involves the group of rights inhering in a citizen's relation to the physi-
cal thing. Traditionally, that group of rights has included the rights to
possess, use and dispose of property."'7 2 Clearly, not all economic, social,
or other interests are property rights requiring compensation."'7 Accord-
ingly, judicial decisions vary in terms of the circumstances under which
such interests are compensable. 5
Courts also have developed a less strict construction of the term
"taking" than was used before the advent of urban renewal.'76 Today, a
taking of private property within the meaning of the just compensation
provision may occur without a formal divestment of the landowner's
title to the property.'77 In deciding to invoke constitutional protections,
courts look to the substance of the condemning authority's conduct
rather than the form;' 78 the public authority cannot avoid liability for
its conduct by leaving the landowner with legal title in the property
while depriving him of the beneficial use of the property.'7 9 Unfortu-
nately, the judicial resolution of how severe the interference with the
landowner's beneficial use must be to constitute a taking has failed to
172. Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 485, 216 N.W.2d 651,
661 (1974); see United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 338-39 (1910) (recovery permitted
for decrease in value of property caused by destruction of access to road); Johnson v. City
of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 605-06 (Minn. 1978) (dictum) (right of access is a compen-
sable property right); Burger v. City of St. Paul, 241 Minn. 285, 291-92, 64 N.W.2d 73,
77 (1954) (dictum) (different types of easements are compensable property rights).
173. Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 485, 216 N.W.2d 651,
661 (1974). Thus, under the modern view, the taking issue in inverse condemnation is
concerned as much with the landowner's rights as with the property itself. See Lincoln
Loan Co. v. State, 274 Or. 49, 545 P.2d 105 (1976).
174. Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 485, 216 N.W.2d 651,
661 (1974). See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03, 511 (1945)
(interest of hydroelectric plant in water level not a legally protected property right; reduc-
tion in generating capacity from rise in water level caused by navigation improvement
held not compensable). The courts have adhered to a vague, useless statement that only
the economic advantages "with the law back of them" are property rights. Id. at 502;
Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. at 485, 216 N.W.2d at 661.
175. Compare, e.g., Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 279, 177 N.W.2d 380,
384 (1970) (loss of rental income found to be a property right protected by state constitu-
tion) with, e.g., Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 53, 500 P.2d 1345, 1356, 104
Cal. Rptr. 1, 12 (1972) (dictum) (rental loss caused by general decline in property value
prior to date of taking not compensable).
176. For a discussion of the breadth of the concept of a "taking," see 2 NICHOLS, supra
note 167, § 6.111].
177. See id.
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produce a concise rule applicable to all situations.'
Despite the state of discord as to what does or does not constitute a
taking, most courts agree with two general propositions. First, a legal
interference short of a physical intrusion can constitute a taking." Sec-
ond, the mere planning of a proposed redevelopment project, absent the
statutory filing of condemnation proceedings and without physical tak-
ing, does not constitute a taking.' Thus, something more than a decla-
ration of intention to condemn but less than a physical invasion would
appear to be necessary to constitute a taking.
Traditionally, absent a physical invasion, a taking required that the
condemning authority impose some direct legal restraint on the owner's
property rights.'8 Although decisions such as Clement provide for com-
pensation for losses resulting from condemnation activities,,"1 that com-
pensation is reflected only in an award for condemned property.'" Be-
cause, according to Clement, the effects of condemnation activity gener-
ally cannot constitute a de facto taking,' 8 a landowner of uncondemned
property suffering losses from condemnation activity is not entitled to
compensation. No taking has occurred. Such a result illustrates one of
the problems that landowners face in jurisdictions in which only uncom-
pensated "taking" as opposed to uncompensated "damaging" is prohib-
ited. Despite the trend towards giving broader constructions to
"property" and "taking," the terms can be stretched only so far to
accommodate the landowner who has felt the impact of a public project
when the only injury is a lower market value of the property.5 7
180. See id. at 6-14 to -15.
181. See, e.g., Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 349-50, 355 A.2d 307, 316 (1974);
Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Minn. 1978); Burger v. City of St.
Paul, 241 Minn. 285, 295, 64 N.W.2d 73, 79 (1954). The Minnesota Legislature has given
the term "taking" an extremely liberal interpretation: "Taking and all words and phrases
of like import include every interference, under the right of eminent domain, with the
possession, enjoyment, or value of property." MINN. STAT. § 117.025(2) (1976) (emphasis
added).
182. E.g., Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 346, 355 A.2d 307, 315 (1974); see, e.g.,
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939); City of Chicago v. Loitz, 61111. 2d
92, 97, 329 N.E.2d 208, 211 (1975); Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 305 Minn. 336,
341, 232 N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975) (per curiam); Thurow v. City of Dallas, 499 S.W.2d 347,
348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
183. See, e.g., Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64, 70 (6th Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974); Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 346-47, 355 A.2d 307,
315 (1974); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 257, 269 N.E.2d 895, 904,
321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 359 (1971).
184. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 143-44 supra and accompanying text.
187. The failure to recognize a de facto taking implies an obligation on the landowner
to continue using his property until a de jure transfer occurs. See 72 COLuM. L. REV., supra
note 1, at 779. That obligation results in a substantial hardship on many landowners of
commercial property. The health of a business enterprise depends in part on its uninter-
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2. "Taking or Damaging" Provisions
In Minnesota, as in several other states, the state constitution pro-
vides a broader scope of protection for property owners by requiring that
just compensation be afforded when property is "taken, destroyed, or
damaged."' In jurisdictions requiring compensation for damage to
property, landowners are not necessarily precluded from recovery in the
absence of a de facto taking. If the effects of condemnation activities are
held to constitute a damage to, rather than a taking of, property, com-
pensation must be awarded."'
Thus, courts applying "damaging" provisions must determine the
meaning of the term "damage." Originally, "damage" was narrowly
construed to mean a direct physical injury.'"1 Because the provision
affording compensation for damage was designed to be remedial, how-
ever, this strict construction of the language has been uniformly re-
jected."'u Adopted in its place was a definition of damage that required
an injury that would be actionable at common law."92 That definition
rupted operation. Relocation can require significant planning. Waiting to relocate until
the actual de jure transfer may not be feasible. Yet, when the landowner relocates ahead
of the de jure transfer, no compensation will be awarded for the loss of use of the vacated
property. The landowner either must stay or sacrifice the use of his capital for an early
relocation. See id. The obligation to remain also can dramatically impact noncommercial,
low- and middle-income property owners. Often, those homeowners have a substantial
portion, if not all, of their capital tied up in their property. With the threat of condemna-
tion hanging like a "sword of Damocles" over the homeowner's head, he will want to locate
a new residence. Before the de jure taking of their property occurs, however, many home-
owners would have inadequate resources to finance new residences. By purchasing ahead
of the taking, the homeowner would have to absorb the interest costs in obtaining finan-
cing even if the principal for a loan were covered by the amount of the award. Considering
the possibility of uncompensated decreases in value, the principal amount may not be
covered. Thus, the threat of condemnation can freeze the capital of both commercial and
noncommercial landowners by obligating them to remain on their properties. See id. at
779-80.
188. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19; ILL. CONsr. art. 1, § 15; MINN. CONST. art. 1, §
13; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
189. For example, in Minnesota, the constitution requires compensation not only for
"takings" of private property, but also for "damage" to private property. See MINN.
CONST. art. 1, § 13. Thus, either a taking or a damaging will warrant compensation. If an
injury is not sufficient to constitute a de facto taking, it may still constitute a damaging
and thus require compensation.
190. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 71, § 6.441.
191. See Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1888) (construing Illinois constitu-
tional provision); Wolfram v. State, 246 Minn. 264, 267, 74 N.W.2d 510, 512 (1956); Stuhl
v. Great N. Ry., 136 Minn. 158, 161, 161 N.W. 501, 502 (1917).
192. See In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 451-53, 204 N.W. 534, 539 (1925), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Breen v. Hull, 275 U.S. 491 (1927) (per curiam); Stuhl v. Great N. Ry., 136
Minn. 158, 161, 161 N.W. 501, 502 (1917). According to Stuhl, the amendment was enacted
not to enlarge the scope of the term "damage" but to make the law of damages uniform
so that property owners could recover from condemning authorities under the same cir-
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also proved unsatisfactory because it often foreclosed recovery for the
specific form of injustice that the provision was designed to prevent.
9 3
Although common law liability is a strong indication of damage, a
lack of such liability should not be conclusive as to the absence of
damage within the meaning of the constitution."' One commentator
observed: "[Miany of the injuries from public improvements which
cause the greatest hardship to individuals would not be actionable at
common law."' 9 Therefore, the term "damage" has been expanded to
encompass most situations in which the landowner has suffered some
disturbance of a valuable property right. 9 Whichever definition of dam-
age is used, the Minnesota court has specifically cautioned that not
every diminution in the value of property caused by a public improve-
ment can be recovered by the owner.9 7 Unfortunately, the Minnesota
court has yet to develop a meaningful standard by which landowners
whose properties have suffered the impact of condemnation activity can
recover damages. 19
3. Establishing a Taking-Relevant Factors
Judicial decisions in the area of condemnation law have not lent
themselves to a concise formula that can be used to determine when the
effects of condemnation proceedings on uncondemned property consti-
tute a taking. Certain factors that may be utilized by the practitioner
to evaluate the possibilities for recovery in a given situation can be
extracted from the decisions, however. The four most prominent factors
are: (1) the imminence of condemnation; (2) the extent of diminution
in the property's value; (3) the existence of abusive conduct by the
condemning authority; and (4) the extent of causation on the part of the
condemning authority.
The imminence of condemnation is a relevant factor.'99 When the
193. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 71, § 6.441[2].
194. See id.
195. Id. at 6-159.
196. See, e.g., Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 306, 475 P.2d 441, 447, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 351 (1970). In Holtz, the court affirmed the general rule that the just compensa-
tion provisions impose liability on government for damages proximately caused by govern-
ment acts absent a showing of negligence. Id. at 305, 475 P.2d at 451, 90 Cal. Rptr. at
355.
197. See Wolfram v. State, 246 Minn. 264, 267, 74 N.W.2d 510, 512 (1956); McCarthy
v. City of Minneapolis, 203 Minn. 427, 431, 281 N.W. 759, 761 (1938).
198. See notes 232-50 infra and accompanying text.
199. See Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327, 1330-
31 (9th Cir. 1977) (announcement of urban renewal and designation of area for condemna-
tion constituted a taking); Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64, 68-69 (6th Cir.)
(property specifically designated for acquisition; ramifications of such designation re-
sulted in a taking), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974); Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn.
334, 348, 355 A.2d 307, 315-16 (1974) (fixed and irreversible intent must exist to establish
a taking); In re Cornell Indust. Elec., Inc., 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 599, 604, 338 A.2d 752,
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eventual condemnation of a landowner's property appears certain, the
landowner may have a more difficult time selling or leasing the property
than a landowner whose property is merely under a potential threat of
condemnation. 0 0 For example, in Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v.
Commonwealth,210 the condemning authority submitted seven alterna-
tive plans for the extension of a proposed highway, each alternative
requiring a complete taking of Conroy-Prugh's property. 2" Because con-
demnation appeared to be inevitable, the court found that a de facto
taking had occurred.2 3 On the other hand, in Orfield v. Housing &
Redevelopment Authority,24 the petitioner's property was assigned a
low priority in an acquisition system that was established because the
condemning authority was not assured of obtaining sufficient federal
funds to acquire all of the desired properties. Therefore, although con-
demnation of the petitioner's property was possible, it was not certain.ro
The court thus found that a de facto taking of the petitioner's property
had not occurred.20
Further, when condemnation is imminent, a landowner is more apt
to take action in reliance that condemnation will occur.201 For example,
an owner may purchase or lease new property and move to a different
location.as Although a landowner's voluntary changes to his property in
755 (1975) (advice of condemning authority and imminence of acquisition were factors in
finding a taking).
200. See Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 120, 343
A.2d 408, 414-15 (1975) ("From the time it becomes generally known that an area has been
selected as the site of an urban renewal project ... there ceases to be a ready market for
premises in the area .... [ilt becomes difficult to find tenants and impossible to enter
into long-term leases .... land) the value of the property tends constantly to dimin-
ish."). Compare Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 659-60 (E.D. Mich. 1966)
(condemnation imminent; tenants vacated and replacement tenants difficult to find),
aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) and Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d
574, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (landowner left without market for land because of threat of
eventual condemnation) with Elias v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 605, 608-09,
362 A.2d 459, 461 (1976) (condemnation not yet imminent; present use of property not
disturbed).
201. 456 Pa. 384, 321 A.2d 598 (1974).
202. See id. at 386, 321 A.2d at 599.
203. See id. at 392-93, 321 A.2d at 602.
204. 305 Minn. 336, 232 N.W.2d 923 (1975) (per curiam).
205. See id. at 340, 232 N.W.2d at 926 (building never scheduled or approved for
acquisition; eminent domain proceedings against building never authorized).
206. See id. at 342, 232 N.W.2d at 927. But see Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v.
City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 122, 343 A.2d 408, 416 (1975) (de facto taking not limited to
situation in which condemnation imminent).
207. See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327,
1329 (9th Cir. 1977) (landowner "reasonably and justifiably" understood that property
would be acquired and therefore refused to offer tenancies in excess of month-to.month).
208. See, e.g., Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 338, 355 A.2d 307, 311 (1974)
(landowner moved plant operations into new addition at another plant); City of Buffalo
v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 249, 269 N.E.2d 895, 899, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 352
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anticipation of a public improvement generally are noncompensable, 2
some courts have been willing to apply an "estoppel" theory when the
landowner has relied on the completion of the condemnation proceed-
ings and injustice would occur if the property was not condemned. 210
Courts applying the estoppel theory interpret the condemning author-
ity's actions as amounting to a "promise" to condemn .
2 1
The extent of diminution in the property's value is a second factor
considered by the courts, particularly when dealing with commercial
property."2 Although no test exists that conclusively establishes how
much property values must diminish before a taking occurs, a land-
owner stands a better chance of recovering in an inverse condemnation
suit when the loss is so burdensome that the property stands to be lost
for a failure to pay expenses, such as taxes. For example, in Conroy-
Prugh, in which the court found a de facto taking, the property's rental
income had diminished severely; Conroy-Prugh could pay neither the
operating expenses nor the taxes on the property. 1 3 Eventually the prop-
erty was scheduled to be sold because of Conroy-Prugh's failure to pay
the property taxes."'
If a landowner proves that no profitable income can be produced from
(1971) (landowner moved entire printing plant to new location).
209. See 4 NiCHOLS, supra note 2, § 13.14. This might depend on the good faith of the
landowner: if he erects a structure on land that he knows will be condemned to enhance
his compensation award, he probably will not recover his extra loss from erecting the
building. See id. On the other hand, if his building was near completion at the time
condemnation proceedings were commenced, and if he completes the building before the
actual land transfer to the condemnor, he probably will be entitled to recover his expenses
for the improvements. See id.
210. See, e.g., Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 362-65, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 605, 612-14 (1965).
211. See id. ("promise" to purchase subject parcels).
212. See, e.g., Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327,
1330-31 (9th Cir. 1977) (property rendered unsaleable and hence "taken"); Foster v. City
of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 665-66 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (actions of defendant that
"substantially contributed to and accelerated" decline in value of plaintiff's property
constituted "taking"), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Washington Mkt. Enterprises,
Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 123, 343 A.2d 408, 416 (1975) (plaintiff must prove
"substantial destruction" of value of property); Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Common-
wealth, 456 Pa. 384, 386-87, 389, 321 A.2d 598, 599-600 (1974) (rental income fell from
$30,000 to an amount insufficient to cover overhead; "significant fact" is loss of tenants);
Reingold v. Urban Redev. Auth., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 266, 268, 341 A.2d 915, 916 (1975)
("all" rental income lost); cf. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct.
2646, 2663 (1978) ("In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a Whole .
213. 456 Pa. at 268-69, 321 A.2d at 599.
214. See id. The case of Reingold v. Urban Redev. Auth., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 266, 341
A.2d 915 (1975) is another example of precondemnation activity that resulted in diminu-
tion of the value of a parcel of property such that the property became unable to generate
enough income to pay the taxes attributable to it.
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the property, the court may determine that the beneficial use of the
property has been destroyed, thus finding a compensable taking. In
Washington Market Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 2 1 the subject
property's rental income plummeted from $160,000 in 1963 when the
condemnation proceedings were commenced to $6,300 in 1973.216 The
court held that "where the threat of condemnation has had such a
substantial effect as to destroy the beneficial use that a landowner has
made of his property, then there had been a taking of property within
the meaning of the Constitution,1212 and remanded the case for findings
of fact on the issues of de facto taking and damages.2 ""
A finding of abusive conduct on the part of the condemning authority
is a third factor that weighs heavily in favor of the landowner.2t The
conduct must be more than mere project planning to be abusive, but it
215. 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408 (1975).
216. Id. at 112, 343 A.2d at 410. At the same time, the annual insurance premium on
the property was $9,500 and the annual property taxes amounted to $30,000. Eventually,
the property was sold at a tax sale. Id. at 112 n.3, 343 A.2d at 410 n.3.
217. Id. at 122, 343 A.2d at 416 (footnote omitted).
218. See id. at 123-24, 343 A.2d at 416-17. By this holding, the court concluded that an
order granting inverse condemnation of the plaintiff's property, as requested by the plain-
tiff, was inappropriate; rather, damages were the only available remedy in this case. See
id. at 123, 343 A.2d at 416.
The California Supreme Court has gone a step further in granting compensation for
diminution in value. In Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1972), the California court determined that when the unreasonable activity of a
condemning authority causes diminution in the market value of a landowner's property,
the landowner is entitled to compensation even though the activity would not have consti-
tuted a de facto taking of the property. See id. at 51-52, 500 P.2d at 1354-55, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 10-11. See note 171 supra for a comparison of the Klopping decision with the
Washington Market decision as they relate to the specific constitutional provisions in
effect in their respective jurisdictions. For a discussion of the current Minnesota standard,
see notes 232-50 infra anol accompanying text.
219. See Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64, 68-69 (6th Cir.) (abuse of condemnor's
power may cause such substantial damage to property as to constitute taking), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267, 1277-78 (E.D.
Mich. 1973) (city refused to issue repair and building permits, discouraged repairs, did
not properly care for city-owned property, and lacked initiative in controlling pollution;
these and other factors, when viewed as a whole, constituted a taking), rev'd on other
grounds, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 662 (E.D.
Mich. 1966) (city "aggravated" area's deterioration and "protracted" delay), aff'd, 405
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 51-52, 500 P.2d 1345,
1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11 (1972) ("unreasonable" issuance of precondemnation statements
by condemnor warrants compensation for property owner); Orfield v. Housing & Redev.
Auth., 305 Minn. 336, 342, 232 N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975) (per curiam) (abuse of power of
eminent domain directed against particular parcel could constitute de facto taking); Note,
The Condemnor's Liability for Damages Arising Through Instituting, Litigating, or Aban-
doning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 548, 552; Note, A Redefinition
of Just Compensation for Takings in Urban Redevelopment, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV.
84, 88-89 (1969) (bad faith can result in change of established valuation date).
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need not constitute a legal interference with the landowner's rights.r
This governmental mens rea may be evidenced by unwarranted, pro-
tracted delays in the condemnation procedure,"' along with affirmative
activity by the condemning agency in causing neighborhood deteriora-
tion.m" For example, in Amen v. City of Dearborn,2 the activities about
which the landowner complained included encouraging people to sell
their property by denying building permits, fixing maximum prices to
be paid by the city for acquired property, maintaining city-owned lots
in a state of disrepair, selling property to businesses that produced
substantial air pollution, and allowing acquired land to remain vacant
and unprotected to induce neighbors to sell.24 In addition, the agency
had posted the following signs: "Whoever wishes to sell to the City of
Dearborn, call City Attorney"; "Sold to the City of Dearborn"; "Free
at your own risk, take any part of the house. First come, first served.
Hurry"; and "Cash for your house. The city will pay a good fair price
for any house in this block. See City Attorney, City Hall. '"22 The court
concluded that although none of the above activities could constitute a
taking by themselves, the combination of activities was sufficient.n26
Likewise, in Orfield v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority, the court
220. Compare Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 119, 514
P.2d 111, 116, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804 (1973) (enactment of general plan for future develop-
ment cannot, by itself, give rise to inverse condemnation action) and Howell Plaza, Inc.
v. State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wis. 2d 720, 729, 226 N.W.2d 185, 189-90 (1975) (mere
initiation of a plan should not give rise to compensation) with Madison Realty Co. v. City
of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (denial of building permits, denial of
reassessment of property for tax purposes, continued publication of renewal plans, denial
of many city services, and other acts of the city held to constitute a taking) and Drakes
Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574, 586 (Ct. CI. 1970) (abusive manner in which
condemning authority dealt with developer warranted finding a taking).
221. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 660 & n.12 (E.D. Mich. 1966)
(condemnation proceedings lasted approximately 12 years), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir.
1968); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (condemnation
proceedings lasted approximately 10 years); City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 317,
136 N.W.2d 896, 900 (1965) (condemnation proceedings lasted approximately 12 years);
Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 111-12, 343 A.2d 408,
410 (1975) (same); Note, 1967 UTAH L. Ray., supra note 219, at 553.
222. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 662 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (defen-
dant's actions substantial cause, if not only cause, of decline in value of plaintiff's prop-
erty; evidence that defendant actually encouraged deterioration), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th
Cir. 1968); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574, 584 (Ct. Cl. 1970)
(officials ignored established means of preventing economic harm); City of Detroit v.
Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 317, 136 N.W.2d 896, 900 (1965) (sending letters to tenants, filing
lis pendens, intense building inspections with citations for code violations, and refusal to
permit long-established business to continue).
223. 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 532 F.2d 554 (6th
Cir. 1976).
224. See 363 F. Supp. at 1272-73.
225. See id. at 1273-74.
226. See id. at 1277-78.
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acknowledged that an abuse of the eminent domain power specifically
directed against a particular parcel could constitute a de facto taking., 7
In contrast to the Amen case, however, in Orfield the city's conduct was
held to constitute the good faith exercise of "normal" activities asso-
ciated with condemnation and urban renewal.?2
A fourth factor that may be considered by the courts is the extent of
causation by the public agency of the landowner's losses .22 Neighbor-
hoods develop, expand, deteriorate, die, and redevelop on their own.
Therefore, courts are not inclined to find a taking based solely on the
public agency's activities absent proof of causation. For example, in
Orfield the court noted that much of the deterioration of Orfield's neigh-
borhood occurred independently of the redevelopment project and, in
fact, might have progressed at an accelerated rate had the renewal pro-
ject not commenced.m When a landowner can prove that his property
would not have deteriorated had the public project not occurred, how-
ever, the landowner stands a better chance for recovery.
2 3'
E. The Minnesota Standard of Compensability
Orfield v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority23 2 presented the Min-
nesota Supreme Court with its first and only opportunity to confront the
issue of compensating for the effects of condemnation activities. Unfor-
tunately, the court gave the question only a cursory examination. No
distinction was drawn between cases involving condemned property, in
which the focal issue is the date of valuation, m and cases involving
uncondemned property, in which the focal issue is whether compensa-
tion is due.23 Furthermore, the court drew no distinction between abut-
ting property and nonabutting property. Instead, in addressing the com-
pensability question, the Orfield court referred to a standard designed
227. See 305 Minn. at 342, 232 N.W.2d at 927.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 341, 232 N.W.2d at 927 (decline not a result of urban renewal project);
Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Commonwealth, 456 Pa. 384, 392-93, 321 A.2d 598, 602 (1974)
(when hearings and publicity cause property owner sufficient loss, compensation war.
ranted); Reingold v. Urban Redev. Auth., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 266, 268-69, 341 A.2d 915,
916 (1975) (property was taken when agency activities caused loss of all rental income from
property).
230. See 305 Minn. at 341, 232 N.W.2d at 927.
231. See Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 662 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (held city
activity caused landowner's loss), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Klopping v. City of
Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 52, 500 P.2d 1345, 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11 (1972) (compensation
required for injury unreasonably caused by condemning authority); Conroy-Prugh Glass
Co. v. Commonwealth, 456 Pa. 384, 392-93, 321 A.2d 598, 602 (1974) (proof of causation
entitled landowner to compensation).
232. 305 Minn. 336, 232 N.W.2d 923 (1975) (per curiam). For a brief discussion of
Orfield, see notes 204-06 supra and accompanying text.
233. See notes 103-50 supra and accompanying text.
234. See notes 151-231 supra and accompanying text.
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to apply to inverse condemnation actions in general, 235 under which
relief will be given "to any property owner who can show a direct and
substantial invasion of his property rights of such magnitude he is de-
prived of the practical enjoyment of the property and that such invasion
results in a definite and measurable diminution of the market value of
the property."' e
To apply this standard, a court must determine what constitutes a
substantial invasion. Although some courts have required a near total
destruction of the property's utility,27 the Minnesota court has been
more liberal in its determination of the meaning of "substantial inva-
sion." In Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Commission3 the court held
that the use and enjoyment of property, free from unduly irritating
noise, vibrations, and gaseous fumes, constitutes a property right that
is entitled to constitutional protection.u 9 In reaching this conclusion, the
Alevizos court alluded to a discussion of the meaning of substantial
interference by the. Washington Supreme Court in Martin v. Port of
Seattle.2 10 According to Martin, the determination of whether an inter-
ference is substantial requires a balancing of private and public inter-
ests."' Balancing is required because the individual landowner must not
be viewed in a vacuum. Although all individuals are expected to endure
a certain degree of inconvenience in their daily living in exchange for




individuals who sustain greater injury than that suffered by the general
public should not be forced to bear the burden of that additional loss.
24 3
According to Martin, therefore, when a landowner's property diminishes
in value as a result of an action that is otherwise in the public benefit
235. See 305 Minn. at 340, 232 N.W.2d at 926.
236. Id. (quoting Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 487, 216
N.W.2d 651, 662 (1974)).
237. See Note, supra note 76, at 594.
238. 298 Minn. 471, 216 N.W.2d 651 (1974).
239. See id. at 486-87, 216 N.W.2d at 662.
240. 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
241. See id. at 318, 391 P.2d at 546-47. A balancing of specific interests, however, needs
to be drawn only in a tort action in which the landowner sues for personal suffering. See
id. Therefore, in an inverse condemnation proceeding, in which a landowner is compen-
sated only for a decrease in the desirability of his land to a "ready, able, and willing
buyer," such balancing may be general, rather than specific. Id.; cf. MINN. STAT. §
462.445(3) (1976) ("An award of compensation shall not be increased by reason of any
increase in the value of the real property caused by the assembly, clearance or reconstruc-
tion . . .of the real property in an area.") According to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
subdivision 3 of section 462.445 implicitly precludes decreasing an award of compensation
resulting from a decrease in property values in the surrounding area that results from a
public project. See Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Minneapolis Metro. Co., 273 Minn. 256,
262, 141 N.W.2d 130, 136 (1966).
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and when that loss is greater than the loss sustained by the surrounding
community of landowners, the landowner should be compensated for
any excess loss. " '
If the rationale of Martin was in fact adopted by the Minnesota court
in Alevizos, a substantial invasion will exist when the loss suffered by
an individual landowner exceeds the level of interference sustained by
the general public."' A reference by the Orfield court to the New York
Court of Appeal's decision in City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co.24 '
suggests, however, that the Minnesota court is in fact taking a more
conservative approach than the Martin court,"7 because Clement re-
stricted compensation to those situations in which the condemning au-
thority caused a physical invasion of or placed a legal restraint on the
use of the landowner's property."'
The adoption of a conservative approach, such as the one taken by
the Clement court and referred to in Orfield, fails to take into considera-
tion many types of injuries to property that should be compensated if
government is to comply with the dictates of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. Compensation under the constitution is due not only for takings
of property but also for damage to property."' A requirement that the
substantial invasion must deprive the landowner of the "practical enjoy-
ment" of his property before compensation is due, however, does not
necessarily account for injuries that do not rise to the level of a taking.
Furthermore, even if damage under the constitution is defined as a
deprivation of the "practical enjoyment" of property, Minnesota has a
statutory provision that requires compensation for "every interference
. . .with the possession, enjoyment, or value of private property."'
Because not every interference with the value of private property consti-
tutes a deprivation of a landowner's practical enjoyment of the property,
244. See 64 Wash. 2d at 319, 391 P.2d at 546-47. The whole idea behind the "just
compensation" provision is that no individual should have to bear an unfair burden of a
public improvement that should be borne by the general public. See Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); 72 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 1, at 773.
245. See Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 486-87, 216 N.W.2d
651, 662 (1974).
246. 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971). For a discussion of the
Clement case, see notes 134-46 supra and accompanying text.
247. The Orfield court referred to the findings of the trial court that no physical inva-
sion of the landowner's property had been committed by the condemning authority and
that the authority had not placed any legal restraints on the landowner's use of the subject
property. See 305 Minn. at 340-41, 232 N.W.2d at 926. Therefore, the Minnesota standard
formulated in Alevizos was inapplicable to those facts. Id. at 340, 232 N.W.2d at 926.
Diminution in value resulting from condemnation activity was insufficient to warrant
compensation in the absence of a physical invasion, legal interference, or abusive conduct
on the part of the condemning authority. See id. at 341-42, 232 N.W.2d at 927.
248. See notes 143-44 supra and accompanying text.
249. See MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
250. MINN. STAT. § 117.025(2) (1976).
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the statutory mandate is not complied with either. Yet, a deprivation
of practical enjoyment must be shown before compensation will be
granted under the present Minnesota standard.
F. Summary
The effects of condemnation activity have been examined in terms of
the resulting impact on property that has been condemned 5 ' as well as
on property that has not been condemned. 52 When property has been
condemned, the focal issue is the amount of compensation to be
awarded to the landowner."' When the effects of condemnation activity
cause the market value of a piece of condemned property to diminish,
that loss in value usually will be accounted for in the condemnation
award.' Oftentimes this is accomplished by means of a "condemnation
blight" approach, in which the date of valuation is adjusted to reflect
the date that the condemnation activity first affected the property's
market value.ns As an alternative approach, the loss in value caused by
the impact of the condemnation activity may be viewed as constituting
a de facto taking, and the date of the taking altered to reflect that
impact. ' Although the specific approach applied may determine
whether such expenses as interest and loss of rent will be included in
the award, both concepts will account adequately for the basic loss in
value sustained by condemned property as a result of the condemnation
activity.
The effects of condemnation activity on uncondemned property have
been examined both with respect to property that was originally sched-
uled for condemnation but was not condemned because the project was
abandoned2 5 and to property that never was scheduled for condemna-
tion but abutted the project area undergoing condemnation.2 11 Because
no physical taking occurs with either of these two types of property, the
judicial interpretation of the relevant "just compensation" provision of
a state constitution will determine whether the injured landowner is to
receive any compensation at all for the loss that has been suffered. When
the state constitution prohibits only uncompensated "takings" of prop-
erty, a de facto taking must be found or the landowner will receive no
compensation whatsoever. When the state constitution prohibits un-
compensated damage to, as well as uncompensated taking of, property,
injuries to property that do not rise to a taking may require compensat-
251. See notes 103-50 supra and accompanying text.
252. See notes 151-66 supra and accompanying text.
253. See notes 125-32 supra and accompanying text.
254. See notes 146-47 supra and accompanying text.
255. See notes 113-18 supra and accompanying text.
256. See notes 119-24 supra and accompanying text.
257. See notes 151-55 supra and accompanying text.
258. See notes 156-66 supra and accompanying text.
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ing the landowner. '
In Minnesota, a jurisdiction with a "damaging" provision as well as
a "taking" provision in its constitution, the courts have not analyzed
extensively the issue of the compensability of the effects of condemna-
tion activities. The standard currently in force in the Minnesota courts
requires a "substantial invasion" that deprives a landowner of the
"practical enjoyment" of his property. Apparently, the Minnesota court
has interpreted the standard conservatively, thus precluding recovery
for many injuries that do not constitute a "substantial invasion" or a
deprivation of the "practical enjoyment" of property but may constitute
"damage" under the constitution.
IV. A SUGGESTED STANDARD OF COMPENSABILITY
In cases involving condemned property, a court's choice between a de
facto taking analysis and a condemnation blight analysis will not affect
the outcome significantly, aside from determining whether losses such
as interest on the condemnation award and lost rent are to be included
in the award, because both approaches account for the effects of precon-
demnation activity on the condemned property.'" When property has
not been condemned, however, the court's approach has a more pro-
found effect. A court that consistently applies a condemnation blight
analysis will not award any compensation when no taking has occurred
because a condemnation blight analysis presupposes the existence of a
taking. Therefore, a landowner of condemned property that suffers from
the effects of precondemnation activity will be compensated for those
effects in the award that is received, whereas a landowner of uncon-
demned property suffering the same effects will not be compensated,
simply because the property was not condemned. The de facto taking
approach, on the other hand, permits the court to find a taking even
though the property has not been condemned, although this approach
also is unsatisfactory because, at present, no standard has been devel-
oped that can be utilized consistently to determine when the condemnor
will be required to appropriate the property. More importantly, neither
the condemnation blight analysis nor the de facto taking analysis results
in a compensation award to the owner of property that has been dam-
aged but not taken.
To treat owners of both condemned and uncondemned property af-
fected by condemnation activities equally, a concise, flexible standard
must be developed that can be applied to all of the situations that have
been discussed in the preceding sections of this Note. Such a standard
should identify factors to be utilized in the determination of whether,
in fact, a particular parcel of property has been "taken" or "damaged."
259. See notes 188-98 supra and accompanying text.
260. See notes 125-32 supra and accompanying text.
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The standard should resolve the question of whether compensation
should be awarded, answer the question of how much compensation
should be granted, and speak to the fears of those opposed to awarding
compensation to landowners whose property has not been condemned
or whose property has been condemned only after a substantial decline
in value. The standard should be flexible enough to deal equitably with
all situations that arise while injecting some predictability into this
developing area of the law. The remainder of this Note attempts to
assist in the development of an acceptable standard that speaks to the
above problems and that will serve as a vehicle for practitioners and the
courts to use in resolving the compensation question.
Clearly, strong fundamental policy arguments exist on both sides of
the compensation issue. Courts in the past have tended to emphasize
the arguments against compensation. 16 The central thesis of this Note,
on the other hand, maintains that landowners should be compensated
for losses resulting from condemnation activities to an extent greater
than most courts have allowed in the past. The above discussion there-
fore has examined the arguments against compensation"'2 in an attempt
to develop a more liberal standard for awarding compensation. Because
the arguments against compensation cannot be dismissed summarily,
however, they must be accounted for in a standard of compensation if
that standard is to serve as an effective guide in determining whether
compensation should be awarded in a given situation. Although the
standard suggested below will result in a greater number of landowners
receiving compensation than are presently receiving compensation, the
standard does take into consideration the arguments of the opponents.
Furthermore, the standard attempts to afford the courts enough flexibil-
ity to produce a just result in a variety of circumstances.
The proposed standard is applied to a given fact situation through the
use of a two-step process. First, whether the loss is compensable must
be determined. Then, if the loss is determined to be compensable, an
appropriate remedy for the loss must be selected.
A. Determining a Compensable Loss
Under the proposed standard, a loss suffered by a landowner is com-
pensable if the loss is (1) proximately caused by the actions of the
condemning authority, (2) pecuniary, and (3) clearly demonstrable.
The loss claimed must be proximately caused by the condemning
authority's activities.2 3 When the loss would have resulted from the
261. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321
N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971).
262. See notes 71-82 supra and accompanying text.
263. See Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 305 Minn. 336, 341, 232 N.W.2d 923, 927
(1975) (per curiam); Lincoln Loan Co. v. State, 274 Or. 49, 57, 545 P.2d 105, 109 (1976);
Reingold v. Urban Redev. Auth., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 266, 269, 341 A.2d 915, 916 (1975).
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natural deterioration of the neighborhood, the landowner should not be
compensated merely because the urban renewal project happened to
coincide with the neighborhood's deterioration."' This requirement is
consistent with current Minnesota law, which prohibits recovery when
the landowner fails to prove a causal relationship between the condemn-
ing authority's activities and the landowner's loss."' The requirement
of a sufficient nexus between the activities and the loss should provide
the courts with additional safeguards from tenuous claims that other-
wise might further burden already congested court calendars.
Second, for a loss to be pecuniary it must be neither speculative nor
conjectural and must be greater than that suffered by the surrounding
community."' This requirement is compatible with the current Minne-
sota standard, which requires an individual to suffer a "substantial
invasion," that is, a level of interference greater than the level sustained
by the general public.2 7 Requiring the loss to be pecuniary also is con-
sistent with Minnesota case law, which continuously has precluded re-
covery for damages that are speculative or conjectural. 2 1 Furthermore,
requiring landowners to allege significant loss would prevent a floodgate
of litigation based on spurious claims.
26 '
Under the proposed standard, a landowner still is faced with the
question of exactly how much the property must diminish in value to
constitute a sufficient loss to warrant recovery. In considering this issue,
transaction cost (the actual expenses incurred in determining who was
damaged and to what extent) should be compared to project cost (the
diminution in market value caused by the condemning authority's con-
duct)."Y If the project cost exceeds the transaction cost, the landowner
will have suffered sufficient loss to warrant seeking compensation.2'
264. Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 305 Minn. 336, 341, 232 N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975)
(per curiam).
265. See, e.g., id.; notes 229-31 supra and accompanying text.
266. Spies & McCoid, supra note 71, at 455; see Lincoln Loan Co. v. State, 274 Or. 49,
56-57, 545 P.2d 105, 109 (1976); Reingold v. Urban Redev. Auth., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 266,
268-69, 341 A.2d 915, 916 (1975).
267. See Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 487, 216 N.W.2d
651, 662 (1974) (court required "substantial invasion"); City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244
Minn. 321, 325, 69 N.W.2d 909, 912-13 (1955) (to recover compensation for damage to
property, owner must have sustained special damage with respect to his property different
in kind from that sustained by the public generally); Wolfram v. State, 246 Minn. 264,
267, 74 N.W.2d 510, 512 (1956); notes 241-45 supra and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Nelson, 257 Minn. 424, 428, 101 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1960).
269. See Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Commonwealth, 456 Pa. 384, 393, 321 A.2d 598,
602 (1974).
270. See Note, supra note 83, at 797-98.
271. See id. at 798. For example, when a landowner has suffered approximately $500
in damages, but would have to expend $1,000 to establish his precise legal injury, bringing
an action for damages would be inefficient and, hence, unwarranted. Although the land-
owner in that situation would not receive compensation for losses suffered, it would be
inefficient resource distribution to reach a different result.
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Finally, the loss must be clearly demonstrable by clear and convincing
evidence rather than by the lesser standard of preponderance of the
evidence." Although this more stringent burden of proof may preclude
some landowners from recovery, it is necessary to prevent nonmerito-
rious claims from reaching the trier of fact."3
B. Selecting an Appropriate Remedy
Once a landowner is found to have suffered a compensable loss, the
precise remedy to be granted must be determined. In all cases, the court
should have the discretion to determine whether damages should be
paid or whether the condemning authority should be forced to acquire
the property. As a guide in exercising its discretion, the court should
look to the present "taking-damage" distinction. If a de facto taking of
the landowner's property has occurred, the condemning authority gener-
ally should be required to appropriate the parcel."' If a lesser injury has
been sustained, the landowner should be compensated for the damages
suffered."' Exercise of judicial discretion in determining which remedy
is appropriate would foster more efficient land usage; in many situa-
tions, an injured landowner can be made whole by an award of damages
and the government will not be forced to acquire property for which it
has no use."'
In proving the damage suffered, the landowner must first demonstrate
the approximate time that the condemnor's activities caused the reduc-
tion in value of the parcel of land in question.17 That date would become
the date of the injury."g Second, the landowner must establish the value
that the property would have had at that date if the condemning author-
ity had not engaged in the condemnation activities. 7' Third, the land-
272. Spies & McCoid, supra note 71, at 455. But see State v. Bentley, 245 Minn. 334,
341, 71 N.W.2d 780, 784 (1955) (dictum) (landowner must prove "taking" by fair prepon-
derance of the evidence).
273. See Spies & McCoid, supra note 71, at 455-56. In similar situations in which sham
or exaggerated claims are likely to arise, such as in fraud or mistake cases, stricter stan-
dards are generally considered to be appropriate. See id. at 456.
274. See Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471,493-94, 216 N.W.2d
651, 665 (1974). See generally notes 119-32 supra and accompanying text.
275. See Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 123, 343
A.2d 408, 416 (1975).
276. For example, in Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Commonwealth, 456 Pa. 384, 321 A.2d
598 (1974), condemnation was appropriate because the ultimate acquisition by the con-
demning authority of the landowner's property was certain. Id. at 392, 321 A.2d at 600.
On the other hand, when condemnation is not certain the proper remedy is damages. See
Orfield v. Housing & Redev. Auth., 305 Minn. 336, 339, 232 N.W.2d 923, 926 (1975) (per
curiam); Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 123, 343 A.2d
408, 416 (1975).
277. See Washington Mkt. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 123, 343
A.2d 408, 416 (1975).
278. See id.
279. Id. at 123-24, 343 P.2d at 416. The court acknowledged that this proof has a
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owner must establish a comparison value: the landowner of condemned
property must prove the value of the property on the date of acquisition;
the landowner of property within an abandoned project area must prove
the value of the property on the date that the project was abandoned;
the landowner of abutting property must prove the value of the property
on the date that the condemnor terminated the condemnation activities
in the neighboring area.28 The landowner should recover the difference
between these two amounts, together with interest from the date of
acquisition, abandonment, or project termination.3 Interest should be
computed based on the market value of the property on the date of the
injury. 92 Any excess of rental income over actual disbursements made
for the property's maintenance during this period should be subtracted
from the compensation award.
283
Thus, pursuant to the suggested standard, any landowner who has
suffered a clearly demonstrable, pecuniary loss, proximately caused by
the condemning authority's activities, would be entitled to compensa-
tion, regardless of whether the loss constitutes a "taking" or a "damage"
to the property. Those terms become relevant only when a court must
determine whether forcing a condemnor to acquire a landowner's prop-
erty or awarding damages is the more appropriate remedy, which will
depend on the extent of the loss suffered by a landowner.
V. CONCLUSION
As the use of condemnation in urban centers expands, an increasing
number of landowners feel the effects of condemnation activities on
their property. Landowners whose property has diminished in value as
a result of condemnation activity have encountered significant barriers
to receiving compensation for their losses. Although landowners of con-
demned property generally have been compensated for their losses by
means of either a condemnation blight or de facto taking analysis, own-
ers of uncondemned property who have suffered similar losses have not
been as successful in securing compensation. In cases involving uncon-
demned property, the courts have become bogged down with the task
of construing the elusive constitutional concepts of "taking" and
"damage." Clearly, this area of the law presents issues for which no easy
solution exists.
hypothetical nature, but maintained that the use of such evidence would achieve a more
just result than using a date prior to the time the public agency's activities began having
a detrimental effect. The court reasoned that in any blighted area, property values are
likely to decline regardless of any action on the part of the public agency. The city should
not be responsible for those losses. Id. at 124 n.11, 343 A.2d at 416 n.1l.
280. See id. at 124, 343 A.2d at 416-17.
281. See id. at 124, 343 A.2d at 417.
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In Minnesota, the current standard for recovery-requiring a substan-
tial invasion that deprives a landowner of the practical enjoyment of his
property-is inadequate. The standard has been interpreted conserva-
tively by the Minnesota courts and fails to account for many injuries
that do not constitute a "taking" of property yet do amount to a
"damage" to property. Thus, the standard does not satisfy the Minne-
sota constitutional requirement that compensation be paid for any
"taking" of or "damage" to property. In addition, the current standard
conflicts with a Minnesota statute that construes the term "taking"
liberally.
In contrast to the current Minnesota standard, the standard sug-
gested in this Note merely looks to the pecuniary loss suffered by the
landowner, as proximately caused by the actions of the condemning
authority. By doing so, the standard circumvents the difficulty of
construing such vague and vexatious terms as "taking" and "damage,"
arriving at a more equitable resolution to the problem of compensation
for loss caused by condemnation activities.
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